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The challenge of Change and Conflict in American Society

Sol C. Chaikin
Donald M. Fraser
Carl Gershman
Tom Kahn
Michael Novak
James G. O'Hara
Jacob Sheinkman
Roy Wilkins
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.

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This pamphlet covers the proceedings of the 70th Annual Conference of the League for Industrial Democracy which was held in New York City on May 2 and 3, 1975. It includes the major speeches and portions of the discussion periods which followed each of the three conference sessions. In addition, it has an introduction to, presentation of and responses to the League's 1975 Annual Award. The order of the pamphlet follows the order in which the sessions were held.



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The Challenge of Change and Conflict in American Society

League for Industrial Democracy
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THE AUTHORS

James G. O'Hara, Democratic Representative from Michigan is Chairman of the Task Force on Party Rules for the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. **Donald M. Fraser**, Democratic Representative from Minnesota, is the National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. Both men headed commissions to bring about reform of the rules governing the Democratic Party.

Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. is a former Chief of U.S. Naval Operations. He is currently Chairman of a new organization, Americans for Energy Independence.

Carl Gershman is the Executive Director of Social Democrats, U.S.A. and **Michael Novak** is Executive Director of Ethnic Millions Political Action Committee. Both men are authors of considerable note whose articles have appeared in numerous periodicals. Mr. Novak is also the author of several books including *The Rise Of The Unmeltable Ethnics*.

Tom Kahn is Assistant to the President of the AFL-CIO and Chairman of the LID Board of Directors. **Roy Wilkins** has been Executive Director of the NAACP since 1955. **Jacob Sheinkman** is Secretary-Treasurer of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. **Sol C. Chaikin**, at the time of the conference, was Secretary-Treasurer of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. He has recently been elected its President.

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Political Parties in the United States

James G. O'Hara

I do enjoy this opportunity to come and speak before your great organization because I'm aware of some of the contributions that you have made to the sorts of things in which I very strongly believe and which I have supported in the United States Congress and about which my good friend Don Fraser has felt and acted similarly.

Will Rogers used to say that he belonged to no organized political party. He was a Democrat. He couldn't say the same thing today. With the rules, regulations, guidelines, charters and compliance review commissions and what have you, no one could any longer describe the Democratic Party as not being an organized political party.

I fear that this state of "over-organization" is not without some serious consequences. A great many of those voters who have had a traditional allegiance to the Democratic Party, many of them working class citizens, no longer call themselves Democrats. I am very concerned about that trend, because if the Democratic Party cannot represent the interests of the ordinary working American and cannot be perceived by him as being the party that represents his interests, then the Democratic Party has lost the character that made it the Party I and most of those here have supported.

How did our Party get itself into this difficulty? You'll recall in 1968 those who favored the nomination of Senator McCarthy, having little support among Party regulars and Party leaders, attributed their inability to capture the nomination to the claim that the Democratic Party was a closed system. They charged that one could not get into the Democratic Party and affect change, that the Democratic Party shut out all who did not share its view.

What they really meant was that people who had no history or background in the Democratic Party were not given the same voice in choosing delegations to National Conventions as those who had long been active and who had achieved positions of leadership in the Party.

I was never able to see anything particularly wrong with the fact that those who represented Democratic constituencies—state chairmen, district chairmen, Democratic Mayors, Senators, Congress-

men, Governors, labor leaders, farm leaders—had a greater role in selecting the convention delegations than did those who did not represent such constituencies.

But it is also true that the critics were able to point to some state Party systems that were really quite difficult to defend. And as a consequence, the Commission on Delegate Selection, which first George McGovern and then Don Fraser headed, drafted an elaborate and complicated set of rules and guidelines to guide the selection of delegates to the 1972 convention.

And in 1972, the Democratic Convention was the least representative convention that the Democratic Party had held in 100 years. We nominated a candidate and wrote a platform that went down to the most crushing defeat imaginable—a defeat whose magnitude we would not have believed possible just a few years before.

Some have claimed that that convention was the most representative of any. Yes, it was representative in the sense that it more accurately reflected the number of minority voters that



traditionally support our Party. It was more representative in that it more nearly equally represented women than any previous Democratic Convention. There were more young delegates than in the past. But it was not representative of the views of a large number of Democratic voters.

If you think that this is just an off-the-cuff observation, you ought to purchase, from a very fine new organization known as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a study by Dr. Jeanne Kirkpatrick of Georgetown University entitled, "Representation at National Political Conventions, the Case of 1972." She points out that on a number of issues that came to the fore during the '72 campaign, the Republican Convention delegates came closer to representing the views of rank and file Democrats than did the Democratic Convention delegates! What the 1972 McGovern-Fraser rules had done was to enshrine the notion of participatory democracy as a method of Democratic Party operation and selection. All Democrats were to have full, timely and equal opportunity to participate in the process.

No one's voice could be any stronger than anyone else's. We outlawed ex-officio delegate selection systems and non-binding Presidential preference primaries and selection by State Central Committees and other devices that had been used in the past to give a much larger role to established Party leadership. We said that each and every delegation must fairly reflect the Presidential preference of those who participated in the delegate selection process. And, instead, that's the real rub: "must fairly reflect views of those who participate."

Who were those who participated in the delegate selection process of the Democratic Party? Well, in 1972, a year of rather intensive campaigning and quite a high degree of interest, far less than one-half of the Democratic voters of this country participated in any way in the delegate selection process. In 19 states where there was no challenge to the manner in which the delegations to the Democratic Convention had been chosen (and which therefore can be assumed in a very litigious year and litigious system to have chosen their delegates in accordance with McGovern guidelines) in those 19 states; less than 20 percent of the Democratic electorate participated in the selection process.

Nationally, 59 percent of Democratic voters participated in primaries in those states which held

primaries. That's a very heavily inflated figure because in some states, such as my own, the State of Michigan, there was an extremely heavy crossover of Republicans and other non-Democrats into the Democratic Primary and they counted as Democrats for the purpose of this 59 percent. (For example, in one of the Grosse Pointes, in which no Democrat had ever gotten over 1,000 votes, 3,000 people participated in the Democratic Primary.)

And, according to the Democratic National Committee (and it's probably an inflated figure), 6 percent of Democrats participated in the caucus states. Well, who were these participants?

They were far from a true cross-section of Democrats. As those who have worked in political campaigns are all too aware, it's extremely difficult to get Democratic voters to vote, much less to induce them to do any other thing connected with the political process. Indeed, the very large percentage of our traditional support comes from people whose only affiliation with the Democratic Party is a habit which proved to be one that can be broken—a habit of voting Democratic every two or even every four years in an election.

The Zeal Factor

That kind of Democrat certainly did not participate in the delegate selection process. Those who did participate were generally better educated, better off, and were primarily distinguished, though, by their zeal. To go out to the caucus, to participate in the primary or the convention, zeal was what really counted. Truly it was a case where one angry man was worth 100 complacent ones. And so we had devised a system that was open to capture by an aroused minority, just as the Republicans had been captured by an aroused minority in 1964.

We had devised a system in which the alienated play a very, very large role. And we utterly fail to represent, or make any effort to represent, the views of the non-participating Democrats, the casual Democrats, those Democrats whose support we need each November. And those are the voters whose support we lost.

Well, you might well say to me, "Fine, O'Hara, but how can you represent the views of the non-participating Democrat? Haven't you defined him in a way that makes it impossible to represent his views? If he doesn't participate, how can he get his views represented?" Well, I think in past conventions we've had a system that did represent

the views of the non-participating Democrats. And it was a system of selecting, and giving a very large role in the convention process to, the leadership of traditional Democratic constituencies—to trade union leaders, to farm leaders, to civil rights leaders, to Democratic Mayors, Democratic Senators, Governors, Congressmen, Democratic state chairmen, district and county chairmen. In short, to people whose very business it was to know the aspirations, the concerns, the program goals of that traditional Democratic constituency on whom we rely to win elections.

These people were committed to the notion that they were going to bring back to their constituency—be it a trade union, a civil rights group, or a city or a county or a congressional district—a candidate and a platform that that constituency would buy. That was the primary goal with which most of them went to the convention.

The most important change in the '72 convention as compared to earlier conventions was the absence of that very kind of leadership. In 1972, the 20 largest cities in the United States were governed by 18 Democratic Mayors but only 12 of them were delegates to the '72 convention; 23 of the 25 Democratic Governors had been delegates in 1968. But only 19 of 30 Democratic Governors were delegates in 1972.

The trend prior to the 1972 convention was one of expanding participation by Democratic Members of the U.S. House of Representatives. For example, in 1956 there had been 80 Members of the House chosen as delegates. In 1960, there were 135 who were delegates. The trend was reversed in 1972 when only 30—only 30 out of 255—Democratic Members of the House were delegates at Miami Beach. There'd hardly ever been fewer Members of Congress as delegates.

There was also a drop in the number of Senators at Miami in '72. Thirty-eight Senators were delegates in '68, only half as many in 1972. There was a similar pattern with respect to representation of labor union leaders. There were 200 full time labor union leaders at the 1968 Democratic Convention. But only 145 at the 1972 convention according to the CBS study of convention delegates.

This drop of 55 labor delegates, all these drops I've described to you, occurred in spite of the fact that the convention was twice as big as it had been in 1968. In other words, of a much larger delegate

body, there were fewer and fewer of the kinds of people who had represented the views of important Democratic constituencies.

Whose Self-Interest?

I make no bones about it being in my self-interest to bring back a candidate who will run well in my district. It makes a great deal of difference to me. I run on the same ticket with him. In 1971, George McGovern got beaten two to one in my district and I damned near lost the election. I won by 2,800 votes. Less than one percent. I didn't have quite 51 percent. To show you what a difference it made, in that very same district in 1974, I got 73 percent. I went up 22 percentage points. So you see it is in my self-interest. I don't dispute that. But here's one of those cases where the self-interest of the labor leader, the self-interest of the farm leader, the self-interest of the politician is also in the interest of the party and the country.

I think we need that kind of participation in our National Convention. I was very hopeful that the Mikulski Commission, which was appointed to review the work of the McGovern and Fraser Commission, would do something to right this problem. But I regret to report to you that nothing effective was done and that now as a result of the actions of the Democratic mid-term convention, at Kansas City, in December, the worst features of the system have been nailed into the party's constitution.

But I don't think that it's impossible to do something about it. I think it is critical that in 1976 we nominate a candidate who represents the views of a cross-section of our traditional Democratic electorate and that we proceed to elect him.

A Divided Government

I've witnessed what has gone on in Washington in the last six years under divided government. I wish I could say that while the executive branch has performed abominably (and it has) that the Congress had distinguished itself. But it hasn't.

It's very difficult in our system to accomplish anything worthy of note in a divided government. And while I'm not concerned that the Democrats will lose the Congress next time, the nation needs a united government, one that can adopt and effectuate a policy to meet some of the very severe problems we face. We need a Democratic Administration and a Democratic Congress.

I think that what we have to work very hard

within the Democratic Party to see what can be salvaged, to see if we can do something to make the convention more representative. At the same time, I think we ought to consider an alternative. Currently we have the worst of all possible worlds. We have a system of participatory selection in which the Democrats don't participate, except those with a grievance and a small band of regulars. If we're going to have a system that only represents the views of those who participate, we'd be better off with some system that would really

turn people out and get them to participate. Therefore, I'm very seriously considering, if it appears that we cannot make changes in the system that we now have, giving my support to the idea of a national primary election.

I say a national primary because I don't know of any other way that we could turn out enough voters to assure the participation of a good representative slice of the Democratic electorate. And I am completely determined to avoid the kind of situation that we had in 1972. (Applause)

Donald M. Fraser

Let me begin by telling you how delighted I am that you are having a discussion tonight on this subject. I have to tell you that in my twenty years in active politics I don't remember a group of interested Democrats ever holding a meeting to talk about the general philosophy or the general principles around which a national party ought to be organized.

Of course some of the disputes that developed in relation to the delegate selection process and the charter proposals were specific issues which were going to have to be voted upon by somebody. But if you set aside the delegate selection controversy and the charter, the fact is the Democrats through the years have never sat down and thought about the question of what kind of a national party can best serve the interests of this nation. But you're doing it tonight and this is one reason that I feel so favorably disposed to coming here to take part in this and make whatever meager contribution I can.

One of the problems I've seen with politics and political systems is that there's been a view that political action and political organization and political decisions all sort of spring out of the earth like crops planted early in the spring. Some seem to believe that by the providence of some divine source we get people who are willing to serve as ward leaders or county leaders or who are willing to run for the legislature or for governor or Congress, or for President.

Now we treat this as a natural phenomenon, as though the whole process is beyond any meaningful and intelligent action on the part of those of us who care and are concerned about the way politics interacts with the way we're governed.

It's very strange that this should be so. And even our political scientists through the years, it seems to me, while they will write extensive analyses about this or that, write as though they are standing outside a zoo looking through the bars and describing the antics of those inside. Rarely do they deal with the system as an integral part of the capacity of a free society to govern itself. Some years ago, the American Political Science Association issued a report, "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System," which advocated some changes, but that report was never really taken up or discussed so far as I know by



political activists who were actually undertaking to elect candidates and hold conventions.

Thus I am glad tonight for the opportunity to present my point of view about what kind of a political party we need in the United States. First, I would like to describe what I think is wrong with the present party system in general terms. Second, I will describe the two most significant deficits or difficulties created by the weak national party system we have. Then I may make one or two comments about what we might do about it.

I don't have to tell you that we have a weak national party system. It's often described as a confederation of fifty state parties. The national party is represented between national conventions by a national committee which doesn't seem to do very much, except make sure that the next convention happens. The national committee for the most part is not the source of programs or development of party position on issues. It doesn't have very effective communication with those who adhere to the Democratic Party across the country, primarily because it doesn't have any money.

Every time that we get a new Party Chairman, out go all the staff, and with them goes the institutional memory. New people are brought on board and they start all over again to invent the wheel and to try to figure out how to make voter registration more effective.

In a sense it is a non-party at the national level except for the fact that every four years we convene some delegates and try to make a decision about a candidate for President. "Well, so what?" one might ask. What difference does it make? We've done this since about the middle of the last century when we went to the national convention system. And one can argue that, well, it's served us pretty well. We got Roosevelt and we got Truman and we got a lot of other good people through this system.

Two Problems

And I agree that we have had some good people. But it doesn't always work out that well. Let me now pinpoint what I think are the two biggest problems that flow from this weak national party system.

One is the problem of candidates. How do you choose a candidate for President or for any other federal office? And, as a corollary to that, how do you get people into the process in the first place who might make good candidates some day? What do we do to pull people into the party who could

be effective and articulate, who are thoughtful and wise and who have the commitment to the principles which represent the Democratic Party?

The other difficulty is that with the weakness of the national party system, there aren't very many people in this country who have any experience in what I would call an active national party system. The consequence of that is that we lack a capacity to understand what is going on in most of the other countries of the world. Almost every other country that has any kind of an open political system has a national party system which is quite unlike ours. Let me take these two points up at some greater length.

Why is choosing candidates so important? Well, the fact of the matter is that it's the elected official who makes the party. It's the elected official who creates the image which attracts new adherents to the party. A good candidate, like Adlai Stevenson, draws in all kinds of people who are attracted by his particular qualities. It is also the public office holders who enunciate programs and issues. When somebody asks today where the Democratic Party stands, you look normally to the statements being made by Members of the Senate or Members of the House, unless the party has an incumbent president.

The problem is that today we are saying in effect that we're going to drop out of the process of picking candidates as an organized party. We're going to turn over the function of picking our candidates to the public and we'll play no part in it as an organized party, except as we might decide to get out and try to beat the drums in the public arena.

This is the consequence of moving, as we are, to a proliferation of Presidential primaries. In 1968, we had 12 or 13 Presidential primaries and in 1976 it looks as though we're going to have perhaps some 30 or 32. A good illustration of what this means to an organized party can be seen by looking at the way California used to run its primary system. A candidate would come into California and pick three people to be his committee. That group of three would then go out and find the delegates who would file on his behalf. Then, if that candidate won the primary, those delegates would go to the national convention. The question I would ask is, where did the organized Democratic Party in California have any role. It had none.

This process bypassed the Party from beginning

to end. In effect, the organized parties were abdicating their responsibility to make a recommendation to the voters about whom we think most nearly possesses the qualifications needed to be a President of the United States.

The Unknown Candidate

One of the consequences of this system is that those who are not already publicly known have almost no chance, or very little chance, of getting the nomination. When you turn this decision over, theoretically, to 220 million people, you impose an impossible task on the person seeking the nomination.

Somebody who registers one or two percent in the polls is almost certain not to become the nominee of our Party. Such a candidate just has too far to go and doesn't have the money and the resources to reach the public at large with all of the expense that entails. But what about George McGovern? He ran and at the beginning he only had about two or three percent in the polls. True, but George McGovern had the war issue. And that war issue had, over a period of some six or eight years, deeply radicalized and energized a large segment of the American public. It had consequences of the kind that Jim O'Hara has described to you.

We don't have that kind of an issue today. We have the economic issue, which in some ways is far more severe. But it clearly does not serve to differentiate the Democratic contenders for the Democratic nomination. What I'm suggesting is that we have locked ourselves into a nominating system today which makes it virtually impossible for an unknown candidate to secure the nomination because he, in effect, has to run for President twice. This might work if you had one Terry Sanford or one Birch Bayh or one Mo Udall or one Henry Jackson but when you've got them all in the race, then it makes it very difficult for those who are not known to break out and become visible.

International Repercussions

The second problem I mentioned about the weakness of our national Party is our lack of understanding of the processes and dynamics of an active national party process. This hinders us when we try to understand what happens in other countries around the world. For example, although we clearly are the most important country in the world, whether measured in economic or

military terms, we have no relationships with the political movements which are to be found in the other industrialized nations of the world, much less the political movements in the Third World.

We take no part in, and I would say that most of our political people are totally ignorant of, such institutions as the Socialist International, or the Christian Democratic Movements in Europe and in Latin America. The result is that when we look at what's happening in other countries, because we don't understand the dynamics of their politics, we tend to view them in a very mechanical sense.

And we don't understand, for example, that as we try to work for development in the Third World that a key component, perhaps the essential component, is political development. Political development must march hand in hand with the capacity to enlarge economic or social opportunities for the people of those countries.

Political development is an important side of American foreign policy. Yet, because of the shortcomings of our own political institutions, we long ago assigned the CIA to worry about political development in Third World countries. As a matter of fact, what the CIA undertook to do in many countries was quite sophisticated and I think for the most part pretty good. But the problem with it was it could all have been done openly. It could have been done in the same way, for example, that in Germany the three political parties all have foundations which are financed in part by the federal government. They relate through these foundations to political parties and journalists and trade union leaders in various other countries around the world. The only thing that we have that comes close to this is the work of the AFL-CIO through such efforts as the American Institute for Free Labor Development which has a much narrower focus and clearly doesn't make an effort to relate to the political movements in those countries.

Let me give a personal illustration of how I think better communication at the political level could help us as we deal with problems abroad. In my opportunities to get to Europe and talk to political people there, I've had a chance to talk with them on the question of American troops in Western Europe. I discovered that from the left, to the center, to the right, the political leadership in Western Europe feels very strongly about the importance of the continued American shield represented by the commitment of the American

forces in Western Europe. It's one thing for me to hear our State Department argue this or to have a Foreign Minister come from another country and argue this. It's something else again to be able to talk to a political counterpart in West Germany or in Britain or in The Netherlands and raise these same questions in a framework of mutual understanding of what happens in the politics of our countries and where we think our interests lie.

The New Charter

These are the two problems I see. We've got a non-selection system for candidates for President, and we lack the capacity at the national level to understand and appreciate what an active national party system is like. But you might well ask: what about the new charter and the new delegate selection guidelines.

In my judgment neither of these has much bearing on what I've been talking about. The delegate selection guidelines have legitimized a process that was very haphazard and uncontrolled. It may be, as Jim O'Hara has argued, that they're too elaborate and perhaps over time that could be corrected.

Part of the problem of the new delegate selection guidelines was that many states, looking at the complexity of them, opted for a Presidential primary, which in my judgment has been a big disaster. The new charter, on the other hand, largely writes down what we've been doing over these past 150 years. It makes very few substantive changes in the structure of the national party. It does, however, provide a starting point because at least we know what it is we need to change if we want to change something.

Prior to the adoption of the charter, it was never very clear how you changed anything because there was nothing to change in terms of any formal document. We never had a constitution for the national party. We never had a charter. And the way the National Committee existed was that every four years the national convention would pass a resolution reauthorizing the National Committee to exist for four more years. At least now we have a framework on which we can build if we can figure out what it is we want to do. But that's the question that I think still remains largely unanswered. What is it now that we want to do? What is it that we want to see our Party become? What kind of national party system do we think would be best for this country?

Let me close with just a couple of comments on the problem of picking candidates. If I had my preference, we'd wipe out these Presidential primaries, or at least most of them. We'd go back to what I call the organized party, the kind of organized party illustrated in part by the one Mayor Daley has in Chicago which can elect people. It is the kind of party which can elect Mayor Daley again and again. It's the kind of party we have in our state of Minnesota. We have used the precinct caucus system, and we've had good attendance. Things got pretty wild in '68 and '72 but a party that didn't get wild in the face of the turbulence in American society would clearly be a very strange party indeed.

But on the whole, our party system has worked well within our state. We used the endorsement system. Our organized party takes the position as an article of faith that if we can't decide who is the best candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor or Senator or Congress or legislature, then how in the world is the public going to know?

So we endorse. We endorse Wendell Anderson and Hubert Humphrey and Fritz Mondale and a lot of other people. And we've learned how to make that endorsement stick.

Well, if we can't go back to that (and I dearly wish we could), we should at least have the organized party make the initial recommendation. It may be that what we'll have to do is take this crazy primary system we now have, maybe rationalized some way such as by regions, and treat it very much as we do state primaries. In other words, it becomes the one place down the track for the public to intervene in the process. Then we could try to move one step earlier to get some kind of ad hoc or informal coalitions across the country which can try to reach an agreement on one or two or three candidates. We would try to give these candidates the opportunity to become known and to win in the primary system.

A National Primary

Jim O'Hara talked about a national primary and I might just give you my own thoughts about that. I have long been opposed to a national primary on the grounds that it took the worst features of the present system and multiplied them and did away with the better features. The worst features are the cost and the fact that you turn the choosing over to everybody rather than to any organized party group.

One of the better features of the present system is that the primaries are strung out. You can get a chance to look at how a candidate performs in one primary before you come to the next. You would lose that in a national primary system. On the other hand, it would not be so bad if we went to a national primary system and treated it as we treat a state primary. In other words, we could have a national primary but hold our convention first. The convention would consist of active party regulars who would make what would in effect be an endorsement by the National Convention. Then the endorsed candidate would file in the primary and if some people think the convention has made a mistake, they can challenge in the primary. Then we would have put the system back into an arrangement that is familiar to all of us at the state level.

This would make some sense. This would enable us to take somebody who is really good but who is not known by the public and make that person President. And we badly need that capacity.

I shall close on the same note that I opened. I'm grateful that you're having this kind of a discussion. It's long overdue to try to figure out what to do with our national parties. (Applause)

Question: Congressman Fraser, you say you're for an organized party but you promoted, through the reforms that you created, an entirely different situation, one in which you don't have an organized party. The party machinery is up for grabs by organized groupings—year after year after year—but you don't have an organized party. You just have a machinery that's up for grabs.

Donald M. Fraser: We turn out sixty or eighty thousand people in Minnesota in our precinct caucuses, which may not be a large number, but it's quite significant. The door is open. But almost everybody who gets elected a delegate has had prior party experience. And that was true even during those more turbulent years when the war was such a dominant issue.

Jim O'Hara and I used to agree that we ought to have party membership. I still favor that although I wouldn't want it seen as a barrier to access. I think, given the tradition of American politics, there needs to be relatively open access to our political system.

The only thing I worry about is this very weak national party system that we have.

Question: Congressman O'Hara, three times you mentioned the people who in many instances chose themselves or who were chosen to represent other interest groups. You mentioned unions and you mentioned civil rights groups and you mentioned farm persons. I never once heard you mention women. I never once heard you mention minority groups. I never once heard you mention young people. I was in Chicago in 1968, inside, and I looked around and it was mostly middle-age, or a little beyond, white males. We did open the process in 1972. I was there. I'm now affirmative action officer of the party in my state. Can you possibly be so simplistic as to say that's why we lost four years ago?

James G. O'Hara: I don't think I suggested that George McGovern lost because he'd been chosen by a convention that had more women in it than the previous ones. I suggested that George McGovern lost because while the convention was certainly more representative in terms of the number of minority delegates and the number of women delegates and the number of young delegates, it was not representative in terms of the political viewpoint of Democratic voters.

I think that the purpose of a political convention is not to represent the sex, age, color and ethnicity of the electorate but to represent the viewpoints of the electorate. And I said that where the convention had failed was in its failure adequately to represent the viewpoints of a cross-section of Democrats. That is how I explain the loss in 1972.

I don't care if the convention is all women. I wouldn't argue that men would do better. I think men and women who agree with me do better than men and women who don't agree with me.

Question: I was at the final meeting of the Democratic Charter Commission and I remember you standing up staunchly for affirmative action. And yet now, you're sounding a little bit more like Congressman O'Hara than I expected you to tonight. What happened?

Donald M. Fraser: We were not debating affirmative action tonight. I happen to believe very strongly in it.

I'm the one that wrote the letter that got everybody into trouble. That was the one that said if a delegation comes in unbalanced the state party has to show that it carried out an affirmative

action program. I still happen to think it's a good principle.

But when I talk about an organized party, I talk about that in contrast to an open primary system in which you might as well forget the party.

My view is that you get the women, the minorities, the regulars, the union people, the farmers, civil rights activists and everybody and you try to hammer out agreement on candidates and, when you can, on a platform. That's what I mean by an organized party. There's been no change in my philosophy about a political party even if it sounds like there has. I just haven't stressed that so much tonight because I'm thinking about some of these other problems with which I don't think we really came to grips in the charter.

Question: One of the things that we haven't talked about at all is that all those parties in Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and so on, are political parties that have a certain set of principles, often socialist or labor. Even the Christian Democrats, as you point out, have a principled position. They are membership parties as well. The parties are based upon a parliamentary system in all these countries, but in the U.S. we have a bastard system of Presidential and legislative system which is very very different from anything that exists in any other country.

That's why I was a little annoyed when I heard my friend Penn Kemble of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority talking about being opposed to Europeanizing the Democratic Party. If that means anything, it means being against having the Democratic Party stand for any kind of principled positions, and it means not having a membership party.

What I am wondering about is how you can do something with this chaotic mass that's the Democratic Party to bring into it a program of principles and an educated membership.

James G. O'Hara: Now what about the party system and what can you do with it? You've put your finger on it. The party system of this country is a product of the bizarre governmental system of this country. You have a division of powers that doesn't work. You have a diffusion of responsibility, not only between executive, legislative and judicial branches, but also between federal, state, county, local, school board, council, mayor, legislature, grange board, etc. We have created a system that the electorate does not understand. I think that that's the root cause of our major problem of

government in this country.

We talk about voter apathy. People don't vote in America. Well, are they really apathetic about issues of war and peace, about issues of whether or not they are going to have a job and how much the job is going to pay? Are they really apathetic about what kind of an education their kids are going to get? No, I don't think so at all. But they have one terrible time trying to relate what they do at the polling place to these issues, because the relationship is a very complex one. I think that accounts for so many turned off voters, and it also accounts for why we don't have parties that seem to stand for more than they do. It's awfully hard to hold a party accountable.

We used to have a system in the State of Michigan in which every two years we would elect in the Democratic Primary somebody from each precinct as Precinct Delegate. These Precinct Delegates formed the day-to-day backbone of our party. When it came time to elect a delegation to the national convention, these several thousands of people who had demonstrated their ability to get the support of the party voters in their precinct were the ones who in effect did the choosing. Then along came the delegate selection guidelines which said: you can't do that! Instead, you've got to elect these Precinct Delegates in the Presidential election year, and each one of them, when he runs for Precinct Delegate has to put behind his name on the ballot the name of the Presidential candidate he is supporting. Then the voters, instead of voting for the person who will make the best Precinct Delegate, are encouraged to vote for that individual who happens to be associated with the Presidential candidate whom the voter prefers. And then we are stuck with that individual as Precinct Delegate for the next two years. We got more Wallace-ites that way than anything else. For the next two years many of these Precinct Delegates wouldn't do anything for the Party because they didn't believe in the principles that the Party was advancing. When I say I am considering a national primary, I am saying that I am so desperate with the way the present system works that I am ready to agree that anything would be better, in terms of delegate selection. If we can't go back to a system where we have representative party and traditional constituency leadership involved in a major way in selecting our candidates, then we would be better off to go to a national primary than to stay where we are.

Question: You say that, well, we would like to see a system which would elect a Presidential candidate based on the old party regulars. But if you want to do something in this country, if you want to change things, if you want to reform the system, you can't rely on grass roots people because all they do is go out and vote on November 4th. They don't do anything the rest of the year. You need people who are going to go out and fight—you need zealous people. Perhaps from there you can go on and build something, you can build a Democratic Party. I would particularly like to hear Representative O'Hara speak about that.

James G. O'Hara: I think that you need a mix. You need party activists. I think that the party regulars are the greatest people in the world. You need that small band of people who believe deeply enough in the party and its principles to be active and to fight for Democratic programs and candidates whether or not there is a particular issue at the moment that arouses them to a fever pitch. I want to encourage their continued participation. I want to make them an active part of the selection. But I also think you have to leaven that with representative Democratic leadership—public officials and party officials, and also labor, farm and civil rights leaders—people who have demonstrated that they understand the feelings and the problems of that very much larger Democratic constituency that does not actively participate in the party process. I think that what you need is a meld of the party regulars and the party leadership. That is roughly the way it worked, of course imperfectly, prior to the reforms in delegate selection, and I think we did pretty well under it. We elected a lot of Democratic Presidents. We nominated some very very good candidates and wrote some good platforms. And we made real progress. I think we make a great deal more progress that way than we do by nominating somebody who might more truly reflect your views, and mine, perhaps, but whom we then can't elect.

Question: Congressman Fraser seemed to me to be saying that the Democratic Party would do best if it would somehow discount the kinds of questions which ordinarily come up at board and precinct meetings, and deal with things like the world food problems, the group dynamics of political meetings, and other questions which are not merely the bread and butter of politics in the country and certainly not the bread and butter concerns of the ordinary Democrat.

My own view is quite the opposite. That indeed it is these very concerns which should be the central interest of the Party, the central items on the Party's agenda. The danger in our moving towards a Party which has a principled program is that indeed the bread and butter interests of the voters will not be the principles which the Party announces. Rather it will focus on those things which are of greatest concern to the more educated, the more affluent, the people who are looking for gratification and education out of politics rather than some material gain for themselves, their families, or the group to which they belong.

I am not against principles in a political party on principle. What concerns me is that if we were to have the principled program today, given the alignment and the forces in the Party, the principles that we would adopt would not be the principles which would most concern the ordinary Democratic voters. It would be a mistake for the Democratic Party to adopt an ideology today. If it were the ideology most likely to be adopted, it wouldn't be the right one. Even if it were my ideology, I wouldn't be happy about it, because I think it would drive people like Congressman Fraser and others into some kind of opposition, if not out of the Party. I don't want to see that.

And so, I am in favor of a Party which doesn't itself adopt a principle but lets the people who have principles work in it and argue for their principles. Such a Party must also seek to forge agreements on very specific proposals which can be carried before legislative bodies and before the electorate in a Party platform. I think that to adopt an ideological set of principles, a la the European parties, would certainly not do us much good at the polls.

Donald M. Fraser: I mentioned that our state Party in Minnesota had held conferences. I don't want you to think that world problems are the only thing that we work at. For example, in my own district, I held hearings recently on the problems of health and on the problems of public service employment, and so I myself am quite sensitive to issues that touch on people, or at least about what they feel strongly. This problem of ideology, I find to be a very tricky one. I am rather opposed to a high ideology party, because you build in rigidities that I think can create all kinds of difficulty, particularly for a country like ours.

I don't think that's a risk, however, at the moment. What I worry about is our capacity to govern. Let me be very blunt about it. One thing, for example, we can't do in Congress is to vote a tax increase. That may sound good, but partly on that account 11 percent of the people are out of work in the United States today. Members of Congress, being such a bunch of nervous Nellies, and without having any kind of a party constituency which they can feel that they can rely upon back in their districts, have simply refused to use the fiscal power of this country to deal with the problem of inflation. We've left the whole matter up to Arthur Burns and the Federal Reserve Board. They put the brakes on the economy, resulting in the kind of unemployment that we've got today. In the last 15 years, we've cut taxes six times: we raised them once and that's now disappeared. (I'm leaving out social security taxes, which always come along under the cover of a social security benefit increase.)

There is a problem about making this government work. We have inflicted on the whole industrial world the most severe depression that they've had since the thirties, and it's largely due, in my judgment, to the incapacity of Congress to measure up to its responsibilities.

Now, we can cut taxes when we need to, and

when it's the right thing to do. It's easy to cut taxes, but we can never go in the other direction, and this impairs our capacity to deal adequately with the economy. For example, I think that a full employment bill like the Hawkins-Humphrey bill is probably the single most important thing that we need in the United States today. I worry about this rather vacuous, disorganized, unstructured system which makes us so incapable of taking hard decisions. I don't know how to deal with this exactly, but I would like to see us, as a national party, start talking about issues, up and down the line, to a much greater extent than we do.

I don't know if that means ideology or not, but for example, I would like to see us undertake as a national Party, to really encourage state and local Parties to have meetings on national health insurance or on the question of how to manage an economy to keep people at work. How in the world can we expect Congressmen to do anything responsible if they don't have an educated constituency in back of them? It seems to me that this is a very critical question to which we have still to address ourselves. It seems to me that we can do much better than we've done without necessarily having the very top-down directed highly rigid, highly ideological party.

How Much Should America Spend on Defense?

Elmo Zumwalt

In order to deal with the subject of defense spending, and to make it meaningful, I think one has to broaden the discussion to include how we spend as well as how much. And in order to get a measure of how much, it's necessary for us to back up and get a running start. Because it's almost impossible to sort out from the daily chatter in the newspapers the trends which are evident if one gets a longer historical perspective.

And therefore, I'd like to back up for you and take as my departure point that period in October of 1962, just a little over twelve years ago, when we were involved in the Cuban missile crisis. You will recall that the man who is today the foreign minister of the Soviet Union was at that time lying to the President of the United States about what the Soviets were up to while they were in the process of installing missiles in Cuba on the sneak.

Now what were they about? They had for a generation faced U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and they had desperately been trying to lessen that advantage. And by this sneak emplacement of missiles, they sought to double the megatonnage that they could bring to bear against us and to cut in half the warning time. And they very nearly succeeded.


When, as Secretary Rusk suggested, we stood eyeball to eyeball until they blinked, you can be very sure that it was because they had made the rational, careful calculation that they had no alternative. They were at that time outpointed, we calculated, in the strategic nuclear field by our advantage of about four to one. As they dropped down the totem pole of military power and asked themselves, assuming that the Americans will not involve themselves in a strategic nuclear exchange, can we handle it at the conventional military level? Again they found themselves outpointed.

They didn't believe they could bull their way through our naval forces around Cuba. They didn't like their options elsewhere. Nevertheless, they tested our will right up to the limit of sending their ships with missiles up to the line of our blockade. Then, seeing that U.S. will was firm, they turned around; they accommodated. We gave them a graceful and a face-saving way in which to

accommodate.

Our Soviet emissary let us know at the time that they would never again be caught with their missiles down, never again be caught in such a predicament. And they embarked on three programs. The first was a tactic to grapple into a period of temporary detente—the test ban. The second was to initiate the most massive strategic construction program in history, one that continues to this very hour. And the third was to initiate the second largest maritime construction program in history, one which has been exceeded only by our own World War II military expansion in the maritime field.

I was director of arms control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For months before the Cuban missile crisis we had been trying to negotiate a test ban with the Soviet Union and had been totally checkmated. After the fright of that crisis, when the Soviets suddenly realized they had faced the prospect of 180 or 200 million casualties, they began immediately to send interesting little signals through various embassies as to how we could



break through the impasse: within a matter of days it was clear that we could have a test ban; in a matter of weeks it was clear that we could have one on terms favorable to the United States; and within a matter of months we in fact had a good test ban treaty.

This was nothing more, as far as we were concerned, than a tactic on the part of the Soviet Union; in our case, it was a contract between someone we didn't trust and ourselves, but it was nevertheless the first of a series of contracts which we hoped somewhere down the road might make it possible for us to have a meaningful, balanced relationship with a superpower dedicated to a totally alien ideology.

We were already talking in that period about the utility of a hot-line telephone which had come into effect just before the Cuban missile crisis; about a ban on weapons of mass destruction, of the seabeds and in space, which is now in effect and has been ratified by most, but not all, of the nations of the world. And we were then already talking about what we called a separable first-stage disarmament agreement, something that would finally begin to cut into strategic arms, something which later became known as SALT.

A Monologue

Notwithstanding the test ban or additions thereto, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara tried to begin a dialogue with the Soviets, explaining that what the United States was doing was producing missiles small enough in size and gross enough in accuracy that the Soviets could not possibly be threatened, or feel threatened, with a first strike against their missile system.

We had about 1,054 and the Soviets had about 350 at that time, and they were urged to consider a similar technique. The dialogue turned out to be a monologue, and the Soviets proceeded to build and build and build huge missiles, many missiles, missiles capable of great accuracy, with warheads so huge that they could destroy ours in a first strike. By the time Mr. Johnson was about to leave office, he suggested that the SALT talks begin. Before his election, Mr. Nixon did not elect to commit himself to them, and they were not started. But after Mr. Nixon came to office, there was a period of circling around, and then the SALT discussions were embraced. They proceeded. The Soviets overtook us in total number

and built and built and built, and by May of 1972 the SALT I agreements that were finally signed—agreements which gave each side two defense sites, two anti-ballistic missile sites each—granting parity because we were ahead of the Soviet Union and they were delighted to grant parity.

On the other hand, in the interim offensive agreement the Soviets were brought to a halt at 1,618 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a 60 percent advantage over our remaining 1,054. They were authorized to dispose of 20 percent of that 60 percent advantage if they chose, instead, to exercise their option to build up to a 33 percent advantage in sea-based missiles and a 34 percent advantage in strategic submarine hulls. They had de facto a 300 percent advantage in throw weight and in megatonnage, and we had a modest advantage in strategic bombers and nearly a 100 percent advantage in MIRVs, the multiple independently retargetable vehicles, or warheads which go into the missiles.

Brezhnev announced to Nixon at the time that he intended to do everything that was authorized under the treaty. He has fulfilled that commitment and more. He's done some things that were not authorized.

Pseudo-parity

Mr. Nixon made it clear to the American people that they had to recognize that this was the best we could get, the Soviets having been building and we not having been building. The Secretary of Defense and those of us who were members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when testifying that this deal probably should be supported, made it clear that it was something we had to recognize as pseudo-parity for that particular moment and that if we wanted true parity of numbers and accuracy and megatonnage in the future in SALT II, the Congress needed to fund the President's strategic budgets. That is, unless we were willing to make it clear to the Soviet Union that we were going to have parity by spending money, we could not get the Soviets to agree to give parity at reduced expenditures.

The Congress passed with alacrity Senator Jackson's very wise resolution which said, in effect, don't come back again unless you have parity. And then the Congress proceeded to cut the President's strategic budget every year, thereby, in the words of our SALT negotiators, denying the United States the ability to give the Soviet

Union any incentive for granting parity.

Therefore, when Mr. Nixon went to Moscow, a dying President in June and July of 1974, he had two alternatives. One was to sign permanent strategic inferiority, and the other was not to sign and to accept de facto strategic inferiority. He chose the latter, the lesser evil.

A few months later, with Mr. Nixon out of office, Mr. Ford, in office with a stronger political base, went to Vladivostok. For that reason, and I think for one other, the Soviets feared only one thing: that was the frightening pace of their success. They feared the possibility that the United States populace might begin to become sullen if not mutinous about the Soviet success, so they improved the deal somewhat, and a great breakthrough was announced.

Twenty-four hundred vehicles each—1,320 of which could be MIRVs, the multiple warheads. And that sounded like ice-cream. But if one looks at the fine print, de facto under that deal the Soviets will have a four-fold advantage in throw weight and megatonnage, and when they finish the deployment of the warheads that they are authorized to put into those missiles, they will have a 2.7-fold advantage in MIRVs. That 4 to 1 advantage is identical to the one we had when we backed them down twelve and a half years ago in the Cuban missile crisis.

Let me conclude the subject of strategic parity by giving you my personal assurance that the very best you can hope for in the years ahead is non-negotiated strategic inferiority, given the unwillingness of the Congress to support the strategic program of the presidents of the United States.

Turning now to the field of conventional arms, we have recognized for years, and I think by high consensus, that the Soviet Union has been accorded superiority in Eurasia of armies and air forces. In the last six years, while we have cut our armed forces strength from 3.5 million to 2.1 million, nearly a 50 percent reduction, the Soviet Union's forces have grown from over 2 million to nearly 5 million, a 100 percent increase.

And that advantage has been further increased. The equalizer over the years has been the maritime superiority of the free-world alliance. In the last six years we have given it up. Between us, my predecessor in office and I have destroyed more U.S. naval vessels than any enemy admiral in history. From 1969 when we had 976 ships until this year when we go under 500, the navy has been

reduced by almost 50 percent.

Your navy has the smallest number of ships since 1939. Now, what is the meaning of all this? If Congressman Les Aspin were here today, he would tell you that the United States has more millions of tons of ships than the Soviet Union, and that would be right. In rebuttal I would tell you that the Soviet Union also has two and a half times as many attack submarines, and that would be right. Les Aspin would then tell you that the United States has 13 aircraft carriers. I would tell you that they used to have 24. He would tell you that the Soviet Union only had one aircraft carrier. I would tell you that while that's true, the second one is being built, and in your lifetime they will have a larger carrier fleet than we have. We would go back and forth on these statistics. And they would all be meaningless. You have to look at the bottom line. On the bottom line is, Can the Soviet navy perform its mission and can the United States navy perform its mission.

Viewed in that light, you have to remind yourself that the Soviet Union is a land power. It is able to defeat its principal enemies, the Communist Chinese and the European NATO nations across land lines of communication. It is able to insure the loyalty and constancy of its allies by invading them from time to time, across land lines of communication, as it has done in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and the rest.

A World Island

The United States, on the other hand is a world island, the center of a vast maritime alliance. We must be able to reinforce our own forces overseas as well as those of our allies. Even if we wanted to turn inward to the continental United States and be isolationist, we would still have to be capable of insuring our importation of that 50 percent of our oil which will be coming from the Middle East by 1978 or 1979, not to mention the 85 percent of the oil which Europe or the 90 percent which Japan must import.

Even if you wanted to write off Japan and Western Europe and bring in our own oil as well as the 69 of the 72 resources which our Department of Commerce judges to be critical, 15 to 80 percent of which comes in by way of the seas, you would still have to be able to use those seas.

The Soviet Union does not need to use the seas. And therefore, when one gets to a crisis situation and asks who can persevere without the use of the seas, it is the Soviet Union. All they have got to be

able to do is cut the sealines to win.

We, on the other hand, have got to be able to use the seas in order to win. Reduced to its simplest form, we have got to be able to insure that the oil tanker gets all the way from the Persian Gulf to the port of New York. The Soviet Union only has to sink it once, fifty miles from the Persian Gulf.

Viewed in that light, the odds are very high that the Soviet Union can cut our sealines in a conventional war today. The odds are very high that we cannot perform our mission, that we would lose a conventional war today. And therefore, having gazed at our own strategic relationship and concluding that we cannot face the Soviet Union, having dropped down another notch on the totem pole, we find that we are in a situation exactly the reverse of the Cuban missile crisis.

Now let us see how that situation has played itself out with regard to a couple of crises occurring during the four years that I was in office, from the 1st of July of 1970 until the 1st of July of 1974.

The first of these was the Jordan crisis of September 1970. There, you will recall, the Soviet Union had set out upon a conscious foreign-policy decision to arm and train Arab armies to keep open the wound between Israel and the Arab nations. Their intention was that this open wound would lead to great foreign policy successes for the Soviet Union. They understood that oil in the Middle East was our jugular and that the linkage between the United States and Israel was so close that anything that could be done to damage it would reduce and hurt the prestige of the United States.

By September of 1970, the Soviet Union felt that these two U.S. construction cutbacks, the strategic on the one hand and the maritime on the other, had given them the remaining power advantage, adding to their superiority in Eurasia, and they needed to prove this. Being careful and cautious and rational, it was not Soviet forces that were used by Syrian forces—Syrian armies invaded Jordan.

Three things went wrong with the Soviet calculations. First was that the Jordanian Army fought better than had been expected. The second was that the Israelis moved their forces northward, clearly getting ready to play a role. And the third was that the United States navy reinforced the Sixth Fleet with a third carrier task force (one of

the 24 that was headed for 13) and with amphibious ships carrying marines.

Now, one of the interesting things about that crisis was that with the huge and awesome power of the Soviet Union, our NATO allies felt the need to stand aside; when I went to the Sixth Fleet with President Nixon immediately after that crisis, the commanding general briefed us about how the Sixth Fleet and the Israelis would have been supported if the President had ordered their reinforcement; the general demonstrated that Army troops would have had to fly out of Germany into the North Sea around the British Channel, through the Straits of Gibraltar, and 2,500 miles across the Mediterranean because overflight rights were not granted across the nations of Europe.

But we had insufficient aircraft tanker support to do this. Therefore, the reinforcement that we did in the Sixth Fleet was the only way to bring relative power to bear. But that combination of factors led the Soviet Union under its cautious approach to conclude—not yet! They had initiated their probe and they concluded that those inscrutable Occidentals, the Americans, had not yet seen the handwriting on the wall.

They promised the Syrians that they would replace their losses, which they did. They proceeded with the continued arming of Egypt. They trained both nations more skillfully. So well did they train them in the art of strategic surprise, that when the attack came on Yom Kippur Day in October, 1973, crisis, strategic surprise was achieved that fooled not only Israeli intelligence but our own.

And Israel was very nearly undone. Only the massive airlift and sealift of supplies from the dwindling capabilities of the United States made it possible to turn that situation around. Incidentally, most Americans don't know that to this date the navy and the army have not replaced in our own forces the equipment that we gave to Israel, so penurious is our Congressional support.

Scrambling from the dwindling number of ships that we had while we were still engaged in Southeast Asia, we were able to deploy 65 U.S. warships to the eastern Mediterranean. Those warships faced 98 Soviet warships, a 50 percent advantage. Although it is true that three of ours were aircraft carriers and none of the Soviet's were, we didn't have a single U.S. air force aircraft available to support us because the allied airfields

were not available. We didn't have a single allied aircraft to support us, but the Soviet Union had the capability to come at us over four separate axes of attack—from the airfields of Egypt, Syria, Crimea, and Yugoslavia, which was actively cooperating with the Soviet Union.

Soviet Ultimatum

I know of no competent authority in the business at the time who did not share my view that had we gone to war with the Soviet Union in that confrontation, the United States navy would have been defeated. Therefore, when the Soviet Union delivered its ultimatum to the United States—an ultimatum every bit as savage as the one that I helped to draft for the Soviet Union twelve years earlier in the Cuban missile crisis—an ultimatum which did not even say "Dear Mr. President," but just "Mr. President," an ultimatum which made it clear that the United States must call off the Israeli army from surrounding of the Egyptian Third Army or the Soviet Union would go in with or without us and over our intervention, quite apart from the political pluses or minuses of doing so—the United States had no rational military alternative but to accommodate.

Thus in twelve short years the strategic and conventional superiority that the United States had had over the Soviet Union was reversed. While Americans were being torn by dissension over our involvement in Southeast Asia, while those in power and those not in power were unwilling to face up to the fact of our rapid deterioration in strength, Soviet foreign policy leapt from one success to another.

Now what does this portend for the future? Does it mean that we are going to have strategic nuclear war? In my judgment, the answer to that is clearly no. Both sides are far too rational. Does it mean we're going to have a conventional war? Again, in my judgment, the answer is no—except for the possibility of a tragic accident of miscalculation on our part—because in the years ahead we should make it our policy to back down as long as possible, rather than going to war with the Soviet Union under circumstances which would lead to our almost certain defeat. You can be very sure that there will be no Curtis LeMay in the armed forces of the United States in the decade ahead as they face the superiority of the Soviet military capability.

Now, how much is enough? It used to be 8 percent of our gross national product. That figure,

the percentage of our gross national product spent for defense, has gone down each year that I have been in office. If Les Aspin were here, he would tell you that we're spending the largest number of dollars for defense this year in history—and that's true, just as your Chevrolet or your local bread is the most expensive in history. But if one examines the constant dollars each year, the fraction of the gross national product has sunk to a new low: the fraction of the federal budget spent for defense has diminished from 53 percent to 27 percent—an all-time low—while expenditures for human resources have increased from 30 percent to 45 percent of the budget. We are spending 33 percent less in constant dollars for defense than we did at the height of the war and 16 or 17 percent less than we did the year before the war began. The Soviet Union, with one half of our gross national product, is spending over 12 percent for military capability while we are spending only a little over 5 percent. As Secretary Schlesinger has recently revealed, they have been outspending us in total numbers of dollars since 1971.

How Much Is Enough?

Now, how can any American expect us to keep them within reach if they outspend us—with their ability to have all kinds of hidden subsidies to their armed forces. How much is enough? With a nation such as ours having twice their gross national product, 1 percent more than half of what the Soviet Union is spending—or 7 percent instead of their 12 percent would do the job.

That amounts to about a little over \$8 billion a year, less than one percent of our gross national product. That would make the difference between our having to accommodate and back down or being able to confront them in the future.

As I travel around the country I find that there are those who consider the outcome of the Yom Kippur War as a great victory for United States foreign policy. The Soviet Union is out of Egypt. The Syrians appear to be tilting toward us. Let me just go back and tell you what the Soviets achieved out of that crisis.

First, the long-term objective of the opening of the Suez Canal. Second, the oil embargo, which they advocated and urged upon the Arabs. Third, the quadrupling of oil prices which they advocated and urged upon the Arabs. Fourth, the prospective starvation of a billion people in thirty underdeveloped nations—something about which the Soviet Union is exultant because of all the

opportunities that gives them to radicalize those regimes. Fifth, the deterioration of the economics of the so-called prosperous free world to such an extent that we are flirting with everything from radical solutions in the cases of Portugal and Italy to the certainty of dramatic additional reductions in the defense budget by the recently elected Congress of the United States. And this kind of Soviet foreign policy success has been achieved without the American people even recognizing that the Soviet fingers were in the cookie jar.

Until we are able to make it clearer to the man in the street than our leadership has been able to, that the price we are paying for a gallon of gasoline today, and the inflationary impact of price increases on our economy, have a direct correlation with the military superiority of the Soviet Union and with the way in which that superiority is being used to achieve dramatic foreign policy successes—until that becomes clearer and is made clearer, we are not going to turn around and get the support for adequate defense budgets. (Applause)

Question: I'd like to ask a question about the Communist victory in South Vietnam. Do you see a correlation between the Fascist victory in Spain and the Communist victory in South Vietnam? And what of the possibility of regional war breaking out in the near future, say in the Philippines and Thailand and Laos. Do you see a possibility of American strength being built up to prevent this regional war in Asia in the next year or two?

Zumwalt: First let me say that there are some similarities and some differences. With regard to the similarities, I urgently recommend that you read a recent book that has come out on the minutes of the Chamberlain Cabinet. You get a frightening feeling that we're reliving the past: the great lengths to which Mr. Chamberlain went to believe that he had true detente with Hitler. The great lengths to which he went to assure his cabinet that Mr. Hitler would not lie to the Prime Minister of England. The great lengths to which the British cabinet went to say to itself, our economy cannot afford to begin to rearm.

Now there are also some differences. First, regional fratricide has been going on in Southeast Asia for a long time. The great accords in Laos are being undone this morning. Within another month or two, Laos will be part of the Hanoi Empire. The

insurgency in Thailand, which began years ago, is now being fed with men, money and material freed from the campaigns against South Vietnam and the only issue with regard to Thailand will be whether they are overturned through Hanoi's insurgency in the northeast or whether their rapid accommodation to Peking and their dismissal of U.S. forces will enable them to save themselves in their present status as a client state of the Chinese government.

With regard to the Philippines, the insurgency which has been going on in the south will undoubtedly heat up at a rapid rate. Meanwhile, Marcos is seeking to accomplish the same thing as is Thailand with his recent announcement that certain Vietnamese will not be accepted, that he wants to take another look at U.S. bases. In my judgment we'll be out of the Philippines in another two or three or four years.

So Southeast Asia is gone. The price that we are paying for the tragedy of Southeast Asia will continue to be paid for a number of years, not only in Asia but in Europe. When Israel told our Secretary of State that they cannot accept the guarantees of the United States, they were saying: "Look at what happened in Southeast Asia. How can we trust you?"

The Soviet Union is so encouraged by our passivity that the Brezhnev Doctrine, which used to apply only to the Warsaw Pact, is now being invoked to justify stationing Soviet warships off the coast of our ally Portugal, while tens of millions of Soviet dollars are being invested in Portugal to accelerate the radicalization of that nation.

These are the kinds of bottom line consequences that we are paying for that tremendous national defeat in Southeast Asia. Now, will it lead to war? I do not think so. The Soviet Union is a much more careful and rational power than was Hitler. You can see them moving very carefully today. There's been almost no bragging in their press. Their exulting is under the table.

They monitor us through Dobrynin, their very skillful Ambassador in Washington whose associates fan out all through our government daily, getting their reports in, picking up the New York Times which has yesterday's top secret information in it. And the Soviet Union monitors our fever chart more carefully than a doctor monitors that of his patient. And the consequences of that are that the Soviet Union will proceed very

carefully, very deliberately. There will be a period of cooling it, a period of praising detente while continuing their plans for differentiated detente. What they are telling us daily in their speeches to their own associates within the Communist world is that the detente is the result of the shift of the correlation of forces, that the shift in the correlation of forces, and they use those words like works of art, has made it inevitable that detente will succeed. And by that they mean differentiated detente: they behave wherever they must and misbehave wherever they can get away with it.

Question: Could you in some more detail tell us how you arrived at the figure of \$8 billion a year that we need to get the military balance again?

Zumwalt: This was a figure that Secretary Schlesinger and I agreed on in a discussion about a year ago as to what we thought it would take to turn the strategic race around and build enough additional naval forces so that we could begin to recover our capability there.

The mere decision by the Congress to add to the President's budget, instead of the destructive \$5 billion average cut that they have made each year for the last five or six years, the mere decision to do it, would send that spike on the fever chart back to Moscow which would immediately carry with it the message—"Hey fellows, cool it, the natives are getting restless, slow down your program, behave, practice true detente for a while." The beginning of an expression of resolve on the part of our people in the face of a careful and rational Soviet leadership would have a dramatic effect.

And over time these kinds of expenditures, which we can easily afford and do everything else that we need to insure the basic medical care, the basic education, the basic social welfare of our people would make the difference.

Question: You spoke of the U.S. Merchant Marines' importance to the maritime industry. Would you care to comment on the fact that the United States at the present time brings in most of the oil and ore on foreign flag ships and what effective controls do we have over these foreign flag ships? And also would you comment on President Ford's veto of the oil import bill?

Zumwalt: In regard to the merchant fleet, during the four years that I was in office, the United States fell back from something like the world's fifth or sixth merchant marine power to something like the tenth or twelfth and is headed

for twenty-fifth or thirtieth at the rate it's going.

The Soviet Union has moved from something like tenth to something like fourth or fifth and it will be number one at the rate it's going. The Soviet Union overtook us with regard to total numbers of merchant ships and with regard to dead weight tonnage back in about 1972. The average age of Soviet merchant ships is under ten. The average age of U.S. merchant ships is approaching thirty.

Congress has never approved an adequate rebuilding of the merchant marine, although this was recommended by the President some three or four years ago. And therefore, we are dependent on foreign flags. Now some of these are U.S. owned and others are not. In a crisis, the odds are that we could retrieve most of those that are U.S. owned. But there is a possibility that the nations under whose flags they fly would seize those that are at least in their ports or a foreign port. So we cannot count on them. Nor can we count on certainly those that are owned by other nations in the event of a crisis.

With regard to the President's veto of the recent oil bill, I'm not familiar enough with his thinking to be able to give a rationale as to why he did it. Nor am I knowledgeable enough on the technical aspects of what was in that particular bill to make a judgment as to whether or not it was worthy.

Question: Recently Jack Anderson printed a story about the recent naval exercise in the Atlantic, a mock nuclear attack in which the Soviets fielded the biggest naval maneuver in the Atlantic Ocean. What is your opinion of that exercise and did they in fact, and are they now in fact, using Cuba now as a naval base?

Zumwalt: In regard to that recent naval exercise, let me report that it's part of the Soviet five year planning process. Their last one was in April 1970 just before I came to office. I studied that one very carefully, and discovered that they had organized attacks on five separate simulated U.S. carrier forces in five different parts of the world at the same time that they organized an amphibious landing of some 1200 miles in reach. They were so skillful at their command and control that those attacks occurred within about 90 seconds of one another around the globe. And it was my judgment after studying all the data that the odds then were just about even that we could have survived a conventional war with the Soviet Union.

Almost exactly five years to the day, in April

1975, the Soviet Union began their second huge worldwide fleet exercise and the growth in their power in that period of time was absolutely amazing. It was, as I said, worldwide in scope, but it had a heavy focus in the Indian Ocean.

And in my judgment the odds have gone way down below 50 percent with regard to our capability to maintain open sea lines and have gone well above 50 percent with regard to Soviet capability to cut our sea lines. And therefore, this is another bottom line demonstration of the rapidity of Soviet success.

Question: This whole question of defense is so technical that I think the layman is really at a loss. You hear so many conflicting statements: you say there is not enough; others say we could cut \$30 billion or whatever out of the defense budget. Then there is always this emphasis on waste.

The point that I'm trying to make is this. The Soviets over the last decade have increased defense spending. Then you have the 1973 war where relatively small armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands fought over a limited time of two weeks and you had the massive American airlift and the result was that even now the equipment and ammunition that were expended there have not yet been replaced.

And it makes the layman wonder where those billions of dollars over decades have gone. In other words, what about the general accusation of wastefulness?

Zumwalt: It seems to me there are three questions involved. First, in regard to the question of waste, the Defense Department is subject to the accusation of waste I think in two distinct ways. First, it has to do with the Southeast Asia kind of situation in which the Soviet Union, by the expenditure of never more than \$3 billion per year, was able to drive the United States up to the expenditure of \$30 billion per year and therefore, to move forward to the point at which their construction curve would give them capability to overtake us.

It was a major strategic error on the part of the United States. I was among many in the Pentagon who felt that the decision to get involved in the war in Southeast Asia in 1964 in a major way was wrong. We never should have gotten involved there. It was not part of our vital national interest. We did not have an alliance with the South Vietnamese at the time.

Nevertheless, the decision was made to go in. I

was among those who felt that if we were going to get involved, the proper way to get involved was to use our air and sea power and go directly after the enemy's heart, as we finally did nine years later, at the expenditure of \$160 billion and more tragically after the loss of 56,000 American lives.

And had that been done, the level of our expenditures would not have had to exceed that of the Soviet Union and we would have brought Hanoi to the truce table in 1964 instead of 1973, as we did within a week after the bombing of Hanoi began. I was among those who felt that after we had made the decision to get involved and after 17 million South Vietnamese had aligned themselves with us and after our allies around the world who were publicly decrying our commitment but privately saying to us, "this demonstrates how reliable you are as allies," I was among those who felt that we couldn't toss the South Vietnamese out of the sled like a baby to the wolves but had to give them the capability to survive. And so I supported the Vietnamization process.

And I am among those, like Sir Robert Thompson, the famous counterinsurgency expert, who believes that even by the time of the truce, the United States and South Vietnam had created a viable situation which the United States proceeded to destroy by its decision not to provide aid in adequate amounts and by its sending the message to Hanoi that we could not react to major truce violations so that Hanoi was able to pour almost every division it had into the south to complete its conquest of South Vietnam.

Now so much with regard to the whole series of strategic errors which have involved the waste of \$160 billion and have given the Soviet Union an immense gain in military capability and an even larger gain with regard to power and prestige.

The Russians are considered good and reliable allies, even if they have to invade you from time to time to demonstrate it. We are considered very poor allies and we're seeing accommodations tilting away from us and tilting toward Moscow all around the world today as a result.

The second part of the waste question has to do with what I would describe as a very irresponsible accusation of some members of the Congress about the huge overruns of the Defense Department. One of the interesting things is that you don't hear the same accusations made with regard to the overruns in our civilian construction pro-

grams. For example, the new Metro system in Washington represents all kinds of overruns, but that's a good overrun, some feel.

In the Defense Department, we've had during the last four or five years hardware being produced which emanated from the old womb or tomb concept. That is, back in the era of the whiz kids, it was judged that what you had to do was require a contractor to sign on the dotted line as to what he would charge you before he had ever built anything. And you forced him to commit himself to a rate of inflation of about 3½ or 4 percent. He actually had a 7 or 8 or 9 percent inflation rate during those years, yet it appeared as an overrun—because the contract was fixed. And almost always, the man hours that it took to build these things were estimated. As a result, as the contracts began to flow, you had overruns.

For example, the Grumman Aircraft Company was forced to lose money for five consecutive years on their F14 contract. We squeezed every drop of blood out of that turnip and when they were within six months of going broke, we then revised the contract amidst great flak from the irresponsible members of the Congress and permitted them to survive so that the world's best fighter aircraft could continue to be produced.

We now have a new system devised by the present administration which permits contractors first to build a few prototypes and therefore get a firm estimate as to how many man hours it will take and to renegotiate annually to allow for the rate of inflation. You will not be reading about overruns in the next several years as we get into that era of production under those contracts. You'll be spending more money as taxpayers than you used to spend in the overrun era, because we used to almost break the company. But you won't be reading about overruns and you'll all be happy.

Question: But why is the arsenal now depleted after the Israeli airlift, which could not have been so massive after all given the scope of the war.

Zumwalt: Well the airlift *was* massive. And it stripped army forces and naval forces of equipment in our actual operating forces. We took electronics equipment and missiles and ammunition from our own forces, which were already below their wartime required stock, in order to make it possible for Israel to survive. The replacement rates have been so inadequately budgeted as a result of Congressional cuts that to this date we have not replaced the equipment. The Soviet

Union, on the other hand, took its equipment from its huge inventory stocks. They didn't have to touch their operating forces. You have to understand that the Congress over the years has been so penurious in its budgets that we simply do not have the capability to stand up to the Soviet Union today.

And this gets me to the bottom line of your question: why have we so little after spending so much? The answer is very simple. We are not spending as much as the other side with half our gross national product.

They have the stamina, the patience, the willingness to hold down the aspirations of their people, the ability to tell their newspapers what kinds of lies to print. We do not.

Question: Do you believe the next probe of the Communist world will be in South Korea?

Zumwalt: I believe that the Soviets will restrain North Korea until all U.S. forces have been withdrawn from South Korea and will then encourage them to overrun South Korea. I believe that you will begin to see all kinds of efforts within this country to persuade our government to remove forces from South Korea. This is the linkage between those who would do less in this country and the subtle massaging that they get from the other side that I think the correlation is very exact.

The North Koreans will be restrained until all forces are out because, after all, the Soviets don't want to have a tripwire. They don't want to have a trigger. They want this thing to go slowly enough that they can get the fruits of victory without the costs of fighting.

Question: To a layman it seems funny that while we're in a jam we are still the leading armaments seller to the whole world. It was Eisenhower, no radical, who warned us about the industrial-military complex. Is this tendency strengthening or weakening? Is there any possibility of reducing private profit as a motivation in the production of armaments?

Also, years ago we used to be kept awake at night worrying about Russia and China getting together. Now it seems unlikely. Is there any chance that there would be a realignment, a sort of Sino-Russian alignment?

Zumwalt: With regard to the aid question, this is a tough one and the argument is fairly balanced on both sides. I've worried an awful lot about that during the last four, five years. First, our decreases

in defense budgets in terms of constant dollars have been so frightening in comparison with what the Soviet Union is doing that I used to make the somewhat poignant comment that we're approaching the situation where the United States is forced to sell its equipment firsthand to the Arabs and will someday be buying it back secondhand in order to be able to afford it.

But the competition is so serious that if we do not sell it to both sides, the British, the French, the Germans, the Italians certainly will and in fact are. We're in competition with them. And the Soviet Union is trying desperately to get into the market and of course is the prime supplier to Egypt and can thus control Egypt because they can turn on and off the flow of spare parts. And it's a definite power tool, which we incidentally have used and did use as a result of conscious decision by this administration in the early days of the Yom Kippur War. Israel was permitted to bleed a little. The equipment was not supplied that would make it possible for Israel to survive, a major miscalculation in my judgment.

Now one can ask himself what happens if the United States refuses to provide all equipment. Unless we have an understanding with both our allies and our adversaries the money will still be spent. The equipment will still be in place. It will just not be U.S. equipment and in a narrow economic sense, we will be disadvantaged.

I would far prefer to see the arms control efforts that we are making be extended to understandings on the part of all the major weapons-making powers that no nation will be provided these equipments. I think there is much more to gain here than there is to continue to fool the American people that we have made progress in the strategic field while negotiating brilliant umbrellas always higher than what the Soviets can achieve during the period of the duration of that agreement.

With regard to the question of the rapprochement between Peking and Moscow, I think we should all sleep less well at night. One of the few things that we have going for us is the fact that China today, while being a de jure member of the Communist bloc, is a de facto ally of the United States.

I was in Iceland a year or so ago trying to persuade them to retain the United States base there. I told them I would wager that the Chinese Ambassador to Iceland has been telling you to please keep our base here and they all nodded

affirmatively.

The Chinese have urged the Turks and the Greeks to get along in order to keep NATO strong. They recognize that NATO represents a counterweight to the fifty Soviet divisions that have been built up out of that massive manpower increase from 2.1 to nearly 5 million men.

The Chinese have made it clear that for the near term they are content to see us remain in Taiwan if we continue our gradual force reduction. They are delighted to see our forces remaining in Japan and in South Korea.

Meanwhile the Chinese, unlike the U.S. with 5 percent of the Gross National Product, and the Soviet, with 12 percent, are putting nearly 10 percent of their GNP, admittedly a much smaller GNP, into offensive capability. And they are rapidly acquiring a tactical air force that can support their already superior numbers of soldiers. They are rapidly getting missiles to sea so that they can avoid strategic nuclear castration by the Soviet Union.

And the day will come when they feel their interests begin to diverge from ours. We, I think, will know that. It will be when they come to us and say, we're now ready to collect on the deal with regard to Taiwan, kindly remove your forces. And from that point on we should begin to worry a great deal about Chinese rapprochement with Moscow.

Question: Given the tendency away from increased spending for the military and perhaps away from increasing involvement in world affairs, what would you see as the probability of another Southeast Asia situation someplace else in the world? How would you suggest we meet that possibility?

Zumwalt: I think that first we should be very, very careful with regard to picking up any additional alliance commitments. I think second, that we should be very, very certain that it's clear to both our allies and our adversaries that all existing alliance commitments from this point on will be honored rather than to continue to develop a reputation of this being a Chamberlain era in the United States.

I think that it is very important for all of us to continue to urge our elected representatives to pay attention to the direct correlation between the military capabilities of the United States and the power and influence that we are able to bring to bear in order to make it possible for the diminishing free world to continue to survive.

Ethnicity as a Social Force

Carl Gershman

I want to begin by defining the subject I'm going to cover. I want to consider the subject of ethnicity not just as a social force in America, but as a social force *per se*, and not just in America but world wide. If this sounds a bit over-ambitious for 20 minutes, it probably is, but I think this approach is justified because that is how the subject is already being considered in the various intellectual journals of discussion.

An article in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*, for example, opens with the following assertion:

We are experiencing on a massively universal scale a convulsive ingathering of men in their numberless groupings of kinds, a great clustering of separateness in which people feel they can find the physical and emotional security they find nowhere else. These are the basic group identities that all people possess by virtue of having been born into a particular family at a given time in a given place. They are tribal, racial, religious, national.

In a recent article in *Commentary*, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan point to the emergence of ethnicity as "a new social category as significant for the understanding of the present-day world as that of social class itself." And more recently in *Encounter*, Glazer identifies the "terminal community that effectively commands men's loyalty," as "increasingly the ethnically-defined community rather than any exclusively interested-defined group" such as social class.

Now certainly ethnic and racial division exists today on an extraordinary scale. A study done several years ago of 132 contemporary nations showed that only 12 countries could be considered ethnically homogenous, one of them being Poland which achieved that "pure" condition only as a result of the mass extermination of Jews and the forced emigration of a larger number of Germans after the war. Moreover, within the ethnically heterogeneous countries, there exists a vast amount of ethnic, racial, religious and national conflict. In some places the conflict is critical and violent, as in Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Southern Africa, Ethiopia, Cyprus, Iraq and else-

where. In some countries, Uganda and Burundi, for example, there have been mass killings, and in others, such as Nigeria, civil war. Religious and national division is a constantly simmering problem in India, Yugoslavia, and to a degree that is often underestimated, in the Soviet Union as well. And, of course, we have our own racial and ethnic divisions here in America.

But in what sense is this news? It would be very hard to argue that nationalism is a more powerful force today than it was, say, at the time of World War I. Certainly it is not more powerful today than it was in the 1920s and 1930s when the menace of fascism emerged. Some 40 years ago Franz Borkenau went farther than Glazer and Moynihan are prepared to go today in arguing that nationalism "is a force which has proved definitely stronger in the modern world than the class struggle...." He went on to write that Marxists "tended to underestimate a force which did not easily fit into their ideas," that they tended to "despise every nationalist feeling—a mistake which has done the labor movement enormous harm



down to the days when fascism won in Central Europe."

Power of Nationalism

So the phenomenon of nationalism or ethnicity is hardly new. But still, the race versus class debate continues to rage, not just among sociologists, but now also among American black intellectuals. Now I don't propose in the short time allotted to try to answer the question of which is a more powerful social force, class or race, but I will try to indicate how one might begin to respond intelligently to the phenomenon of nationalism itself. Which is to say, I would like to see if one can arrive at some position which avoids the error of denying the existence or power of nationalism as a force while at the same time not legitimizing every nationalist or ethnic expression.

Let me begin by observing that the Left has a most uneven and unclear record on this question. As Borkenau said, there has existed the tendency on the Left to reject out of hand all forms of nationalism and to oppose all nationalist movements. The most outstanding representative of this point of view was Rosa Luxemburg who ended up alienating the main section of the Polish socialist movement which viewed her as nothing more than a Jewish intellectual who had no loyalty to Poland. As George Lichtheim has observed, she also isolated herself from the Jewish Bund which regarded her as a self-hater, indeed, a traitor to the Jewish people.

George Orwell had a phrase for the anti-nationalism of the intellectuals of his day. He called it a form of "transferred nationalism," "a way of attaining salvation without altering one's conduct." The British intellectual was anti-British, but at the same time passionately pro-Russian. The transference, according to Orwell, made "it possible for him to be much *more* nationalistic—more vulgar, more silly, more malignant, more dishonest—than he could ever be on behalf of his native country, or any unit of which he had real knowledge. When one sees the slavish or boastful rubbish that is written about Stalin, the Red Army, etc., by fairly intelligent and sensitive people, one realizes that this is only possible because some kind of dislocation has taken place."

The dislocation Orwell speaks of was disaffection, not an uncommon phenomenon today. He described the disaffected intellectual as one who "still feels the need for a Fatherland, and it is natural to look for one somewhere abroad. Having

found it, he can wallow unrestrainedly in exactly those emotions from which he believes that he has emancipated himself." There is something terribly familiar about all this. We have our own anti-nationalists of the Left, who have become infatuated with the free air of Peking, or the gentle, peace-loving ways of Hanoi, or the progressive leadership of Moscow. There are also more than a few anti-nationalist Jews who have transferred their loyalties to those who want to "liberate" Palestine.

There have also been some people on the Left who have had a more realistic appreciation of the force of nationalism. One of these was Lenin who cared nothing for theory, class theory or otherwise, but only for tactics. And tactically speaking, nationalism was a force he couldn't ignore. He promised autonomy to the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR, yet also threatened to crush any nationalist movement that threatened his regime. And when he had to look for support for his isolated revolution, he didn't turn to the Western working classes which he knew wouldn't support him, but to the then-emerging nationalist and anti-imperialist movements of the East. The outcome of the world struggle, he wrote, could be determined by the "conflict between the counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East." Little did it matter that this went against everything that Marx had written. Lenin knew where to find his potential allies. Thus did the Communist movement embrace the cause of so-called "national liberation."

Otto Bauer, the Austrian socialist, also appreciated the force of nationalism. In his case, his perception grew out of the conditions of Central Europe which was deeply divided along national lines, and in particular out of the conditions of the Austrian socialist movement which was separated by language groups into a series of independent parties.

What Kind of World?

Now I would venture the thought that the confusion, hypocrisy, and division of the Left on the national question doesn't derive from national division—one national group against another—as much as from division over the question of the kind of world that we should have. A Trotskyite I once debated on the subject of the Middle East said essentially this when he declared that he supported the nationalism of the oppressed, not

the nationalism of the oppressor. Which is to say, he supported those nationalist movements that would lead to the kind of world he wanted. Now this is all fairly crude, so let us examine the idea of discriminating among nationalist movements a bit more closely. In particular, let me touch briefly on how that much abused and much misused thinker, Karl Marx, approached the issue of nationalism.

It is true that Marx saw national differences and antagonisms diminishing as a consequence of the development of the bourgeoisie, free commerce, a world market, and an increasingly uniform mode of production, with the conditions of life increasingly corresponding in uniformity. Yet in his active political life he was a vigorous supporter (unlike Rosa Luxemburg was later to be) of the movement for Polish independence. He took this stand not because he believed that Poles were inherently superior to other national groups he didn't support, but because Polish independence would create a buffer zone that would check Russian influence in Europe, and Marx viewed Russia as the most reactionary force in the politics of his day. Similarly, he supported Irish independence because he felt the English working class could not achieve power so long as the English landed oligarchy was strongly entrenched in Ireland. I could give other examples, but the point is that his evaluation of nationalist movements was based fundamentally upon their relationship to the struggle for socialism.

Now this approach has its difficulties. How can one be sure which nationalist movements will serve what ends? One can't *really* be sure, though close political analysis based upon a consistent commitment to such principles as democracy, freedom and equality would be most helpful in dealing with what is certainly a very complicated problem. It is hardly more helpful simply to accept every nationalist tendency that comes along as worthy of support.

I would suggest that one reason for the lack of direction and clarity on this question is that many people no longer have any idea of the kind of world they want to build. Liberals, in particular, are suffering from an acute case of cynicism and guilt which makes them reluctant to pass judgment on what kind of political system is the best for people to live under. But this is really only another form of transferred nationalism, since Shirley MacLaine, who would never think of supporting democracy for the South Vietnamese (that would

be cultural imperialism) doesn't hesitate to rave about the advantages of totalitarianism in China.

To conclude this point then, I am taking the view that nationalist movements—indeed, all social movements—must be measured against the standard of social democracy. How does one apply this to today's world?

Randolph's Approach

Let's look at America first. While I am in principle an integrationist, I think there were some instances in American Negro history when a nationalist approach was warranted. In particular, I am referring to the March on Washington Movement of 1941 when A. Philip Randolph organized what was essentially an all black movement, and he did it for two reasons, both of which I think were valid at the time.

One reason was that this was the best way to exclude the Communists who would have taken over the movement and used it for their own—and Moscow's—purposes. They had already done this with the National Negro Congress, forcing Randolph to resign as its president.

The second reason was that at that point in history, before the whole period of mass protest, that it was essential for American blacks to demonstrate that they could achieve their objectives on their own without always being dependent upon white support. He said at the time: "The Negro must look to himself for freedom," but he also said (and I think this is important in judging Randolph's relation to the kind of Black Nationalist tendencies that emerged in the 1960s) that, "Negroes must not fight for their liberation alone. They must join sound, broad liberal social movements that seek to preserve American democracy and advance the cause of social and religious freedom."

In other words, on the one hand Randolph believed in a kind of nationalism. Yet he also believed that the Negro movement had to be integrated into a much broader social movement—guided by a humane vision.

Now by 1963 the situation had changed substantially. The issue in 1963 was to get legislation passed to promote the civil and economic rights of blacks. As Bayard Rustin wrote in "From Protest to Politics," the question was how to achieve broad social change for the whole society, and in this regard a separatist movement was in no way relevant. What was needed was a broad, integrated class movement which would achieve not just civil

rights but also social and economic change.

By 1963, therefore, nationalism was both regressive and divisive. I would add that its emergence in the 1960's helped bring conservatism to power in America by dividing the liberal coalition and by offering the Right an issue with which to play havoc with the Left. That is why the issue of nationalism is such a difficult one in America. I would also say that many nationalists in the late 1960's completely lost the humane vision that governed A. Philip Randolph's conception of social movements thirty years before.

Now another "national" problem within America is the whole ethnic question. I'll just comment very briefly on this because we have someone much more knowledgeable here today than I. I only want to point out briefly why, in my view, the expression of ethnicity in America is something basically progressive.

I think that the impulse behind it is democratic, and I would say that for two reasons. First, the ethnic revolt represents a refusal to conform to the social standards of the WASP elite—that group in America which is the top group, the ruling group. The so-called ethnic is essentially saying, "I'm going to be a worker." Thus, the assertion of ethnicity in this case is a form of working class integrity, and therefore it's a very democratic expression.

Also, the assertion of ethnicity, particularly as it emerged in the late 1960's and the early 1970's, represents a protest against the assault on the values, customs, and beliefs of the American working class by the New Left and New Politics movement. Again, the reaction to this assault has been something progressive and democratic in that it is basically a class reaction, even though it took the form in the 1960's and early 1970's of ethnic assertiveness.

The Question of Zionism

A few words about several other nationalist issues. First, the question of Zionism. I want to offer three reasons (there are no doubt others) as to why I feel the Jewish national movement is a basically progressive movement worthy of support.

One has to do with the form it has taken, which is to say, it has been a movement in which democratic and socialist ideas have had decisive influence. The second reason is that Israel is a technologically and intellectually advanced society in a generally backward area, and from a socialist point of view this is a mark in its favor. Third (and

here we should remember the reasons for Marx's defense of Polish independence), Israel is now playing the role of resisting the expansion of what is undoubtedly the most reactionary force in the world today, namely, Russian totalitarianism.

From this same point of view, one can say that the Kurdish movement, which was recently suppressed, is something worthy of support. The Kurdish movement was weakening Iraq which was one of Israel's enemies and also one of the Soviet Union's allies. This is one of the reasons, although not the only reason, why I think that movement can make a positive contribution.

A third general area relates to the question of nationalism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. Here I would say that even though some of these nationalist movements have tendencies which are not always enlightened, and in some cases even racist, I would say that these nationalist movements are basically progressive. The simple reason is that they constitute a resistance against Soviet imperialism and have the potential of leading to the breakup of the Soviet empire. Moreover, as these nationalist movements create cracks in the totalitarian system, you may begin to have political groupings taking shape which could be the focal point for the development of some internal democracy, or at least for the loosening of central control. Such developments should definitely be encouraged.

Now all this is to say that nationalism can be either a good or a bad thing. I would also say that it is a phenomenon that must be treated very cautiously. Orwell, who is always enlightening, wrote that, "Nationalism is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and prestige, *not* for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality."

One could point out, in this regard, that the rise of totalitarianism is not unrelated to the rise of nationalism in the twentieth century. The fascists made good use of appeals to national pride and to the hope for national rebirth as a means of mass mobilization. And today, within the American political process, there are demagogues who use appeals to group chauvinism as a way to advance objectives that undermine our democratic political system.

But nationalism, if seen as a form of cultural expression and not as a political movement, can

give richness and diversity to human existence. I, for one, do not take issue with Solzhenitsyn's remark, made in his Nobel lecture, that "the disappearance of nations would impoverish us not less than if all men should become alike, with one personality and one face. Nations are the wealth of mankind, its generalized personalities; the least among them has its own unique coloration and harbors within itself a unique facet of God's design."

Otto Bauer, the Austrian socialist already referred to, once wrote that "Our task must not be to stamp out national peculiarities but to bring about international unity in national diversity." I thoroughly agree, but it is becoming increasingly obvious that this cannot happen without certain political and economic preconditions. A world in which a large portion of the people live in abject poverty will hardly allow for "international unity

in national diversity." Even more, a world in which totalitarianism exists as an expansionist force may allow for a form of international unity, but only of the kind imposed by force, and only after immense bloodshed and suffering. To the degree that totalitarianism exists in today's world, it blocks the possibility of genuine communication between nations and encourages the most extreme forms of national chauvinism and aggression.

The paradox is that "international unity in national diversity" can only exist if there is a single moral standard to which all nations adhere: a single standard by which to judge good and evil, injustice, suffering and oppression. If there is to be uniformity, it should be on the level of political democracy and economic well-being. Within that kind of a world national diversity will not merely exist. It will flourish. (Applause)

Michael Novak

There's an old French proverb: "Whoever writes, writes against somebody." It's useful in talking about ethnicity to point out what it's opposed to. That is, if you are encouraging ethnicity, what is the enemy of the ethnic groups?

I think it's very important to get that clear right away and then move away from it. But first of all, it surely is not other ethnic groups. The enemy of an ethnic group is not other ethnic groups, that's suicidal, and mutually destructive. If there's new interest in ethnicity, it's exactly to prevent that kind of mutual destruction.

Secondly, the enemy of ethnicity is not cultural or political unity. If you lose that unity, you lose everything. We all go together.

So I come—I guess I am a trinitarian, after all—to the third point: the enemy. The new ethnicity is so right that the enemy won't last very long. They'll come over. They're not intransigent, eternal enemies. The enemy is super-culture, or what today I will call the top ten percent, or what I will—borrowing from the way one should speak nowadays—call, in a dreadful word, classism. There's an odd coincidence: viz. that approximately ten percent of the American population at this point has had four years of college—not quite ten percent actually. It won't be ten percent until about 1984. (Laughter)

Now, secondly, that about ten percent of the population, even when husband and wife are both working, had an income in 1968 of about \$17,000 or above. Ninety percent of the population has below that, even though in half the families



husband and wife are both working, even though the 40-hour week was outlawed about 40 years ago, and yet many working people are still working 60 or 80 or 90-hour weeks, sometimes at two or three jobs.

And, finally, the same ten percent is roughly that employed in professional jobs, where there is a certain status, where you're paid by salary, not by the hour, and so your time is your own. And, therefore, your political potency is great.

There are also mass magazines, like *Time* or *Newsweek*, who even in their fondest dreams could not quite boast that when their copies are circulated through libraries and through various hands they have about 20 million readers. The actual figure is more like 9 million, 7 million, 5 million—somewhere around there. Twenty million readers would still be only one-tenth of the American population. You tend to think everybody in America reads *Time* and *Newsweek*, but it isn't so.

Now it seems to me extraordinarily important for our politics and for our cultural life, to analyze this top ten percent very clearly. In politics, on the left in particular, it is extremely important to see whether the inspiration for politics on the left is coming from this upper ten percent—solely, or mostly, for their interests and needs—or whether it is a politics which derives from working people—black and white, of all ethnic groups in the country.

It used to be that standing on the left meant to stand with working class people. But it has increasingly come to mean, especially in the last seven or eight years, coming to be enlightened, coming to live in a culture attuned to the moral and political and emotional needs of this very new class. It is a class new in its size. It is what some have called the richest left in the world.

Now it's in that context that I want to join the question of class and ethnicity. I would agree entirely with those who would say that class is a pre-eminent issue. I guess if I were forced to a wall, I would say that it's more significant in almost all circumstances than ethnicity.

But what I would like to argue is that the ethnic factor, which is now apparent worldwide, not just in our own country, derives from sources that are structural, and we have to pay attention to it. It can be, as it has been, a main source of the progressive and democratic politics in this country.

The structural reason for the new ethnicity, I

think, especially on a worldwide basis, is a kind of resistance to what some have called "The Coca-Colaization of the world"—that is this vast pressure for homogenization, and this vast thirst for, as it turns out, control by an elite part of the population in all parts of the world.

A Common Language

If you put together the managers from any country in the world, they—as they themselves will tell you—talk a common language, and they pride themselves on having the one true melting pot. Their problems, their technological problems, are much the same from country to country. They try to impose modernization on variously resisting or eager populations.

Under the promise of modernization, a great many people began to think that whatever their ethnic heritage was, or tradition was, or caste was, it was something to be dropped. It was a burden—it promised less than the new wealth and new riches, the new organization of a society that would be modern, technical and corporate.

In almost all parts of the world, there is increasing resistance against the failed promises of modernization and homogenization. There is a search again for roots in the past, that might promise a stronger moral current, a stronger integrity between one's emotions and one's mind, and above all, a stronger bond between family life and society. A family scale, if you will, rather than a national, corporate, political and economic scale, so that the stronger force of the economic order doesn't so much crush that weaker one of the family and personal lives.

That much by way of preparation, if I can—and now to talk more explicitly about problems in the United States.

It's important to stress that it is in this upper class, in this upper ten percent, that reporters and journalists now fall, and consultants like myself and so forth, now fall. It's in that upper ten percent that we stand. And we tend to give problems the definition to suit our own life's needs. We are chiefly responsible for defining politics for the public, and for defining the common issues—that's what's important.

Today, in *The New York Times*, on Page 42, there is an article that seems to me should appear on Page 1. It's about small homeowners in Chicago, gathering together to fight red-lining on the part of banks, and developing a program of

massive protests, which they call green-lining. That is, the withdrawal of their money from savings and loan banks that refuse to give mortgages in the neighborhood, or refuse to spend a certain amount of money in the neighborhood.

What's happening is that the banks are taking money out of the local neighborhood and spending 80 or 90 percent of it far away for shopping centers in the suburbs, and for mortgages in the suburbs. People in the neighborhoods find it impossible, especially once the neighborhood begins to take in over a certain percentage of blacks, because the banks refuse to make any more loans.

And, the result is, as one can easily imagine, that the economic life of the neighborhood disintegrates and integration of the races takes place within a very rapid time frame—integration lasts for that short period of time that the first white begins to go until the last white has gone. And, then there's simply a rapid changeover. In Chicago, some people have already moved three or four times. This mad chase, it looks like, will go around and around like a kind of musical chairs until the end of the century.

So that's an insane situation. Now here are groups, white and black binding themselves together, to try to fight the thing. That, it seems to me, is an extremely important story, and more significant even than the story about busing in South Boston which we have seen repeated over and over again, and we may see it repeated over and over again as it moves from city after city across the United States.

I would like to argue that the ethnic factor is an important one in understanding the problems in Northeastern cities, North Central cities and increasingly in states like Florida, Texas and California—which we don't ordinarily think of as very ethnic. But the great migrations of the last few years have made them quite “ethnic,” even in the familiar sense of the Northeast.

The importance of the ethnic factor is diagnostic rather than organizational. It is true for some groups and on some issues that it's possible to use ethnicity—being Italian, or being black, or being Jewish, or being Irish, being Latino or Chicano, and so forth—it's possible to use ethnicity as an organizing theme, organizing people on some issues or in some context. But over all, I wouldn't promote that. Over all, I don't think it would work. Over all, I don't think that most people are susceptible to that kind of organization. Only

under certain, very few, circumstances do I think it works.

Yet the ethnic factor is very important for diagnosing what's going on, even if your strategy is not to organize around it.

McGovern In Watts

I'd like to give you some examples of what I mean by that. Let me use one first from the political campaign in 1972. George McGovern was giving a speech in Watts, Los Angeles, in June of 1972—a very important speech for him. It was the Sunday before the election and he had never succeeded in getting more votes out of the black community than Hubert Humphrey. He needed to show that he could draw, heading into the Democratic Convention, if not a majority, at least a very large share of the black vote in California.

So his staff arranged a picnic, a Sunday morning picnic at that lovely park in Watts—which is on the site of the riots—a rather sacred spot in Watts now. It was a glorious day, like today—a little warmer. A fantastic rock band was playing. You can't imagine music at a higher pitch.

And, at the moment, within the hour—Angela Davis was acquitted, and the news went by word of mouth to the approximately 5,000 people with their children—entirely black faces except for the busload of McGovern staff and the busload of the press. And, you cannot imagine a more ecstatic occasion.

McGovern got up to speak and he started out—with all of that enthusiasm and vigor coming right off that rock band—and he announced that Angela Davis was acquitted. So of course, there's a tremendous cheer. And, then McGovern began to speak in his high-pitched voice, rather like my own actually—and his small South Dakota gestures—seldom larger than that [gesture]. You have to understand that people allow you to be what you are. Remember when everybody tried to change Jack Kennedy, to stop making his gestures—and stop putting Rs at the end of his words? And, he refused to change, and pretty soon of course, everybody in the country was talking like this [gesture]. (Laughter)

People will allow you as a presidential candidate or anything—to be what you are. And so, I don't think that people held it against McGovern, though it was a little hard to get used to his very low emotional presentation of himself. If you can imagine by contrast Hubert Humphrey talking to such a crowd of many thousands. I always see

Hubert Humphrey with a two-foot shield of red heat (laughter) around him—throwing it off to whatever kind of crowd it is, anywhere in the country. Whatever circumstance he finds himself in, he meets the mood of the crowd—better probably than any American does. In fact, one of the reasons that he talks so long, is that he won't stop until he feels that he has reached everybody in the room. (Laughter)

Well, anyway, the crowd's mood just went down, down, down—like this, as McGovern talked, and his last line was—well, now with some passion—"I want to take this country back to its ideals of 190 years ago." (Laughter) There wasn't anyone in that audience who wanted to go back to 190 years ago. (Laughter)

The point is that this was an image, this was a beautiful image for McGovern—a beautiful America, a lovely America—but it wasn't a lovely America there nor in Homestead, Pennsylvania, or Buffalo, New York, or many other places. Not only black audiences, but in many audiences in America, there is no desire to go back to 190 years ago. That's not their America. That has not been their experience of America.

Inner Images

So at least the ethnic factor means this much—knowing that specific people came to America at different times in America's history, and also to different places in its economic order, with a different set of possibilities and a very different image of what America means, and what its future can be. These inner images of ours are different from those of people who sit right next to us, who wear clothes out of the same factory, speak with the same sort of accent and so on. We're very homogenized in many respects, and yet, it can remain true that we carry with us a different symbolic geography, a different geography of the soul, because of our very different experience of America.

Let me go to a second step. Sometimes we talk about and hear a great deal about people "losing faith" in America. Again that seems to me an odd expression, at least for many of the Americans that I know, who never had an opportunity, at least in an important way, to have much faith, especially when you mean faith in politicians.

In Western Pennsylvania, your very first experience in America was paying a bribe to get on the line, in the mills or in the mines. You learned right

away the way things actually operated, different from the way they maybe should have operated, or the way the official ideology pictures that it is operating. But that doesn't prevent you from having a great attachment to America and from recognizing that that part of your family that came to America, rather than to Australia or Argentina or to Brazil or to Russia or to Germany—where so many of our families went in the last one hundred years—that that part of us that came to America was exceedingly lucky, that we came to a political system, which I think it's fair to say, for all its faults, has the highest form of maturity and development, the highest form of possibility, on this planet. That is, it is possible for people to have a very great passion about America and love for America, without trusting anybody. (Laughter)

Mario Puzo, the minute he got the contract for *The Godfather*—why? I don't know—called his mother immediately. It wasn't real until his mother knew. She wasn't going to give him any advice. She wouldn't understand. So he called his mother and his mother was baffled. She didn't know what a movie contract was, and she simply said, "Don't let them cheat you." (Laughter) Which they did. He didn't get a percentage.

Archie Bunker

There are a million stories like this. You watch the TV camera coming in on a neighborhood in Queens, and then they give you Archie Bunker. Now "Bunker" isn't exactly a Queens name, nor is "Archie" a Queens name, and I don't know anybody in Queens who has quite the respect for authority that Archie Bunker has. (Laughter) In Queens, they don't even wait to tell by your behavior: before they even meet you, already they know they don't trust you! (Laughter)

Archie Bunker is a character from a small town in Ohio, and it's true that in Carroll O'Connor, we have an Irish face and the physical mannerisms of many people in Queens, but his political attitude is very different from attitudes in Queens.

You remember the Presidential Commission on Pornography, which reported back that pornography doesn't hurt you. There was a later minority report that said, "It does hurt you." Then Spiro Agnew was assigned the job of carrying the minority report to the American people—to this Silent Majority, as they imagined this fiction they had created. The Silent Majority.

Spiro Agnew said, "Pornography is eating away

at the social fiber. It destroys the pillars of society. It brings down society." Well, I asked a construction worker in Queens what he thought of the Vice President's speech, and he showed me the picture in his helmet (laughter). He showed me the picture on the inside of his cab (laughter), and then said, "What I think is, if pornography does so much damage, why don't they fill up about fifty planeloads with it, dump it on the VC and get that thing over with." (Laughter)

What I'm trying to suggest is that there are an extraordinary number of good Americans—and this man might have been from a Catholic parish where they once took a Legion of Decency Pledge, and where everybody talks about pornography, but that doesn't mean that they're all against pornography! (Laughter) Sometimes you talk most about the things you love most. (Laughter) Most social preaching is about the greatest sins of the community, and they speak against it so much just because they can't make any headway against it. (Laughter)

Now I want to add another point which we commonly forget. One hundred years ago, about 90 percent of the blacks who now live in our Northern cities did not live in Northern cities. They lived in the South. And about 90 percent of the Catholics—Catholic immigrants that came to this country—had not yet come to this country, and the same thing is true of Jewish immigrants who came to this country—had not come yet.

Two Migrations

The history of the last one hundred years, certainly in the Northeastern and North Central states, is in large measure the history of two great migrations of peoples from different parts of the world, who had undergone quite different experiences over the last two or three hundred years, indeed over the last one thousand years—peoples completely unprepared for one another and unrelated to each other up to the time they met in these Northern cities.

Now, we have, it seems to me, a very poor knowledge of the conditions of their meeting. Here we are a hundred years later, and the future of our cities—the Northeast and North Central states, in particular, the main presidential states, the main electoral states—here we are with a relationship between these two groups that is truly the most significant relationship in the United States.

Newark is a city almost entirely black, except for a small Hispanic population and an Italian-American population. In Detroit, two out of three people are either black or Polish. In Buffalo, it's very largely the same. In Chicago, in Pittsburgh, in Toledo, in Cleveland, in Philadelphia—almost the only people left in the cities are blacks, in some cases Latinos, and either Catholics or Jews. Very few Protestants by comparison. Very few.

That, it seems to me, is the central political issue, the central political situation over the next thirty years in the United States. Now how do we go about understanding it, or dealing with it? I can only make a very few remarks. But I would like to underline three or four factors.

One is the resistance to feelings of guilt and appeals to the morality on the part of many Catholic immigrants. Catholics number about one in every four Americans, and if you look at American history from the perspective of the Catholic experience in America, which is largely the experience of the last one hundred years, America looks very different. There is a certain cynicism in the Catholic population, taken as a whole, which it seems to me is very healthy.

This is not a good country in which not to be cynical. It helps to be cynical. You see a lot of things more clearly. Cynicism is not simple; it has several different dimensions. If my grandmother had ever heard a former colleague of mine at Stanford speak, Professor Carl Ehrlich describe how the end of the world is coming soon—there's only twenty-five years left of ozone, ten years left of oxygen, and is it in twenty years the waters will all be brackish unless we change our ways, and I think he said that within thirty years, we will die the most horrible death of all—up to our armpits in babies. (Laughter)

But if my grandmother had heard him speak—I know exactly what her response would have been—she would have said, "Eh." She always knew the world would end badly. (Laughter) When—it wasn't plain—it was a secret when, but it was going to be awful. (Laughter) And, she never believed in progress. Now I used to think she was old-fashioned. I didn't realize she was ecological. (Laughter)

When my mother praised the tomatoes that came in cellophane after World War II—I think you remember that—piled up in those first supermarkets, and my mother was so impressed—they weren't dirty, they were hardly ever rotten. But

my grandmother's comment was, "But they don't taste like tomatoes." (Laughter)

So she always believed that what they gave you on one hand, they took away on the other hand. But there are an extraordinary number of people in the United States who don't have that great faith in upward mobility, who don't believe in progress. It's true in the top ten percent. The upwardly striving have a special faith

Stability—A Social Value

But among a great many of the American people, people will turn down a higher paying job because they don't want to move. They prefer to be with their families, prefer to take lower pay, they prefer to lead a rather modest life. There are a lot of people for whom that's true, and I think a great deal of the preaching and so forth in Catholic communities is aimed exactly to favor such an attitude. That's an important social fact.

Some 40 percent of the Italian-Americans in the New York area still live in the same neighborhoods where they came after immigration, in the last seventy or one hundred years. Especially among the Slavs and the Italians, there are many who deeply value stability, who don't like to move, and even if they have the money to move to the suburbs, many would prefer to live near the cheese stores and the wine stores and the church, near their neighbors, near their relatives—whatever.

Now that is a very important reason if you're talking about a nation whose main goal is integration. That's a very critical resource—people who have reasons for wanting to stay. How can you develop a politics that will help them to stay? How can you develop a policy that will reward integration rather than punish it?

What now happens in almost any neighborhood that begins to integrate is that it begins to be punished. There is indeed institutional racism, but it affects the whites who stay there just as well. It isn't true that the garbage is picked up one more time a week. It's usually one less time. It isn't true if you call somebody because your street light goes out, that it's repaired quicker. You just need to find which agency to telephone, get through on the telephone and get them to put aside their novel long enough to take your phone number. Eventually when they get enough phone calls, they will turn around and look for somebody from Princeton or Yale, a new form of graduate students to give a consultant's fee to, to make a study of why streetlights are going out. (Laughter)

Voice: I'm not sure—but we Catholics call that Protestant patronage. (Laughter)

Because in a Catholic city with a Catholic form of politics, which our opponents call a "machine," and which we think of as a highly personal kind of politics, where everybody is accountable, you call your precinct leader, who calls the ward leader, who calls the district leader, who calls City Hall. If that street light isn't changed in one week—somebody loses his head!

Now we think that's very personal and very accountable, but our opponents always, always call it a *machine*, in need of being "reformed." It has gotten to the point that when a Catholic in America hears the word "reform"—or hears the word "morality" in politics—before he hears anything else he feels something like this in his stomach, "I don't know how yet, but they're out to get me." (Laughter)

Isn't it true? What I'm trying to suggest is that while the labor unions do a very good job in the factory and at the plant site—on economic issues—and indeed, when the final votes come in, those votes are usually in a progressive and liberal direction. This happens when the economic issue is kept salient.

Still, when people go home to their neighborhood, there, neighborhood and community problems have become dominant, and they don't always vote in line with their economic interests—even then.

Policies for Integration

There's no think tank in the United States, there's no group of intellectuals anywhere in the United States that I know of, thinking about how we make neighborhoods stable—what kind of federal, state and city policies we need to have in order to encourage integration and to reward everybody who integrates—how to deal with specific points so that we can begin to integrate—integrate all neighborhoods, so that we don't have a pattern of one neighborhood in the space of two or three years, overnight, all black—but to have integration all around the circle. The way things go now, there is not so much integration as exchange of neighborhoods and destruction.

But where—up to whatever level it is—the different communities easily accept a certain level of integration, where there's no panic, where there's no anxiety—there can be a kind of integration based I think chiefly on class factors. When

people of roughly similar class backgrounds—whatever the race or ethnic composition, live together—class being a powerful force in the United States, so close to the jugular in the United States—then it seems to me that there is a good chance of integration succeeding.

Nobody is even thinking about the policies we have to have for banks, for savings and loan institutions, for the Small Business Administration, all the other institutions around the city—the Sanitation Department, and so forth—in order to make integration succeed.

There's almost nobody thinking. Our absence of thinking about it has hurt us so very deeply. We haven't diagnosed exactly the different residential patterns of people in the cities.

On this note, it's important to understand that most of the immigrants who came here from Southern and Eastern Europe were—a hundred years ago—serfs, not free men and free women, and that their experience of liberation, their experience of emancipation is roughly about as long as that of blacks in America.

In the village of my grandfather, which last year I was the first in the family to visit, in Eastern Slovakia, I discovered that in the countryside as a whole there are more castles than anywhere else in Europe. Every hill has a castle on it, every village. I also saw some old inventories from these castles, when they listed the number of cattle, horses, sheep, chickens, and men, women and children that belonged to the lord of the castle.

In the village of my grandfather, people were allowed to purchase their own property, and to work for themselves for the first time in 1927. Now, that's an important psychological fact. Martin Luther King, when he preached in the South, would preach about guilt with respect to slavery, and the peculiar relationships between whites and blacks this slavery forged. But when you preach in a Northern city about the relationships between whites and blacks, at least when you preach to largely Catholic audiences, they have almost no feeling of guilt about slavery, and no feeling of involvement at all—and why should they have?

Even with respect to the competition between blacks and whites, perhaps we do not have enough sensitivity to the damage done by institutional racism. Nevertheless, there are few, very few feelings of guilt with respect to white-black relationships, and there is a kind of feeling of fear of

blacks as competitors, a kind of indirect respect for blacks. They are competitors on almost every level and must be faced.

The Politics of Guilt

To interpret the problems of Northern cities therefore, in terms of the politics of guilt, the politics of morality—will almost always misfire—as a tactic, just as an approach. It will almost always stir resistance. If you're a Catholic in America, you already feel guilty enough. (Laughter) I mean, our whole experience in America, even when we play Bingo—(Laughter)—the common accusation is our immorality. Otherwise, why would we need to be reformed so much? (Laughter) So to add on one more thing to be immoral about—does not usually have good effect. In some audiences in America, it's true—the more you make them feel guilty, the more you make them feel immoral—the more they cheer and yell—and pay. (Laughter)

They love it. It's true. And, it's been given a name—Mau-Mauing. You go into a restaurant, and the service isn't quite right, you get a little bit angry. Some people fear anger. They'll do almost anything to keep you quiet. That doesn't work in Slavic neighborhoods or Italian neighborhoods. People don't mind anger. People don't mind when the temperature goes up. I guess you're not really a decent Slav actually, unless you get angry at least three times a day. (Laughter)

Finally, I want to say a word about busing—just want to drop a line and not go on very long about it. I've written in the past in defense of busing, but I've come to realize that except under 'very favorable circumstances, it is not a good instrument of racial integration. It is defined as an instrument of racial integration in the Democratic Party Platform in the last two conventions. I agree with that. It is an instrument. But it must be judged instrumentally. When does an instrument work and when doesn't it work? And, for a whole host of reasons which I cannot go into at the moment, and which I think are apparent, it doesn't usually work.

In Detroit, where the next busing order is awaited any week now, there are now 70 percent black students and 30 percent white students in the inner city, who will be bused.

It's hard for me to figure out how busing is going to help anybody in those circumstances. It's hard for me to figure out how busing between the two worst schools in the State of Massachusetts—

which is roughly the situation in South Boston, is helping anybody. One hundred sixteen blacks went to college last year from Roxbury High School, and from the white high school in South Boston, three whites went to college last year. There doesn't seem to be any great advantage for blacks in being shifted to South Boston High School and I don't see any gain for students who are going either to South Boston High School or the Roxbury High School.

You see, it's the classic position, again an ethnic position, I would say, of those who are strong and powerful in the Boston area pitting the two weakest groups at their weakest point against one another, and making progress impossible for either one.

Well, it seems to me, in a word, that busing is the Vietnam of the 1970s—it's desired mostly by the best and the brightest, it's designed by the best and the brightest, and it's imposed by the best and the brightest—and the best and the brightest will never pay any of the cost of it.

And, I don't see in a city like Detroit, or Buffalo, Pittsburgh, or St. Louis or other cities—I don't see very many good effects coming from it. I see many bad effects. Above all, busing postpones concentration on the much more urgent area of jobs, the much more basic order of economics.

If you don't understand the basic issues in the United States as meaning jobs, economics and class, you don't understand anything about the United States. We have to fix our attention there, and not be dissuaded by the language of morality—which is not the natural, spontaneous language which is really useful in politics.

Finally, there are many groups for whom relationships with the aging are very important. In many groups it's considered a very important element of morality to care for your own aged. They care for you when you're young. You care for them when they're old. Under present conditions in the United States, it's very difficult for people to do that.

Homes aren't built now to keep three generations—or two generations together. The social and economic rewards are practically nil for doing that. There are now very few policies, almost none, which would reward families who take care of their own mothers and fathers, their own grandparents, and have for their children the asset of the presence of the grandparents.

For Slavic families, Italian families, and for also

many other kinds of families, there's a deep feeling of immorality or betrayal, having done something wrong, when the grandparents are in one way or another institutionalized, or moved out.

Why isn't there some sort of social reward for families, on the annual average of three or four thousand dollars, some sort of tax adjustment or benefit of some sort, since it costs the state ten, eleven or twelve thousand dollars if the state has to care for the aged outside the home? Why aren't there ways of rewarding families?

Different groups have different welfare needs: that's my point. It's not as if everyone has exactly the same needs. It depends on the living patterns of the group, even over a thousand years. There are some very different needs with respect to education, with respect to the aging, with respect to stability or mobility. Some groups move every ten or fifteen years. In many cities in America, you can trace the migration of the Jewish community, every fifteen or twenty years. Or of the Irish community—the Irish tend to rent in very high proportions, and the Slavs and the Italians tend to own their homes as a very first priority. Even before you educate your children, you try to pay off the mortgage. Why? Because that's a sign of liberty. That is the image of being a free man or a free woman, for the first time.

So different groups have different needs in different places, and it is a kind of resistance against bureaucracy and centralization, to try to define these differential needs. (Applause)

Question: What is your opinion of scatter site housing? I'm particularly thinking about the Forest Hills area. In a middle class Jewish neighborhood, they proposed to bring in black and Puerto Rican lower class people. This is a clash, not only of race, but of class.

Michael Novak: In general, there has been a gross failure in understanding the issues of class in the United States, especially in terms of residences and education. It seems plain to me that most people choose their residence for class reasons. Chiefly, they identify class with the school system.

Now a policy which is sensitive to class issues and is sensitive to ethnic issues would take account of what I call, cultural equality. They took care in the Forest Hills project to plan the electricity, the plumbing, and the sewage—all the physical things.

But nobody took any care to plan the relationships between human beings. That seems to me to be an insane form of politics.

I would also like to stress that these considerations are also in the busing decisions over the last ten years by the Supreme Court and the other courts. They have failed to take note of class and ethnic stratifications and the history of schools and neighborhoods in the Northern cities. It's very different from the South. If you don't take that into account, you're not taking into account the real world.

So it seems to me that Forest Hills and other places are once again examples of a politics of morality applied heedlessly to living human beings.

Question: You said at the beginning of your talk, Mr. Novak, that the enemy of ethnicity was the upper ten percent, the best and the brightest. There have been several examples from political life recently where this group has used ethnicity as a tool in a power struggle. I think it happened in the Democratic Party, where ethnic identification and biological identification was fostered. This is also true when conservatives foment differences between black and white workers. Would you comment more on the superculture's use of the ethnic question to influence political life?

Michael Novak: The key issue is how you define problems. Ever since the Kerner Commission defined all the problems in terms of race, I think we've been misfiring, especially in the Northern cities. Color is not the determinant. By some indices, American blacks in some areas are not doing nearly as badly as other groups.

I'm not trying to say that their problems are less serious. But if you constantly pit blacks against whites in every statistic, every figure, every news broadcast, every news article, you create great damage. And it's with that damage that the demagogues work.

Now you can use ethnicity in destructive ways. You can use anything in a destructive way. The question is finding ways to use it constructively. I said that the best and the brightest won't be the enemy forever, because I think you'll see more and more people simply noticing reality, and making possible creative uses of reality. But until now, there has been so much blindness, and a great deal of damage has been done.

Carl Gershman: What worries me is that those referred to here as "the best and the brightest"—the elitist elite, as it were—will come to their

senses, figure out the ethnic game, and learn how to use it. I have in mind the quota issue.

The best and the brightest—specifically the liberal New Politics element in the Democratic Party have been able to use appeals to sex, race, age, or what have you, to undermine class-based institutions, such as the labor movement. When you do have representation along racial or other biological lines, inevitably the representative will be someone who lowers politics to the level of biological group chauvinism. This will be divisive, and it will also lead to the neglect of legitimate economic interests and, I fear, to the weakening of democratic institutions.

For example, if somebody gets to a convention because he or she is a black, a woman, or a youth, that person will go to the appropriate caucus, and within these caucuses it is inevitable that the broad political questions which have to do with democracy and economic policy will be neglected because all that matters is if one is sufficiently black, female or young. In this kind of situation, the demagogues will have a field day.

Question: What are the implications of ethnic culture for education and the teaching of values?

Michael Novak: I wish I could say that I had this thought out clearly and could give you a five point answer to the question, and even more God-like that I could snap my fingers and execute it. But let me give you some examples.

In the neighborhood where I live in Long Island a good many people have moved out, mostly Italian-Americans from Brooklyn, in the last thirty or forty years. There is a great deal of violence among the kids, a great deal of anger and hostility and breaking of windows and things of that sort. Now if I understand what's happening, frankly, it's something like this.

In the old neighborhood, people looked out for one another. It wasn't just the families that watched the kids. Whoever thought somebody was getting into any kind of trouble, you went to the kids directly and slapped their faces. There was a pattern in the neighborhood, watching over young people.

Now where we live it's much more upper class. Even if you see the kids doing something, it would be very wrong to tell their parents. Now the school doesn't know how to account for this.

It also, in the lower grades, doesn't account for this in the curriculum. The varied differences in the Italian family are never in the textbooks. It's

always a one or two-child family with very formal relationships. In other words, it's not only blacks who are left out of these textbooks.

I remember it so vividly, even in grade school and high school when I read novels. I loved to read English novels and American novels to find out how the foreigners lived. (Laughter) You know, in our home when we said Americans, we meant the Irish. (Laughter)

Now it seems to me to mean that you have to do a whole rethinking of the curriculum. In history books you never found Slavic families, even in the Pennsylvania history books. About 30 percent of the people in Pennsylvania are Slavic-Americans. In Pittsburgh recently, there was a newspaper strike. On TV they read the obituaries and none of the announcers could pronounce the names. It was the only time in the history of Pittsburgh that the Slavs had equal time. (Laughter) But it's true in the schools. There isn't a paragraph about the history and the role of the Slavs in Western Pennsylvania. It's as if we didn't exist.

A progressive politician cannot win in Pennsylvania without coming out of the white ethnic ward with an enormous majority in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and Scranton, to overcome the Protestant rural vote. The same thing is true in Illinois. The white ethnics vote. I mean they actually go out and vote. I'm sometimes afraid that they vote twice. (Laughter)

I learned yesterday that Sammy Kaye was a Slovak-American. Hurray! But that doesn't really do anything. What it would help to know is what are the distinctive family values, economic values and so forth which Slavak-Americans tend to do. They tend to break out in very different patterns from other Americans, and what's the connection between that and what you learn in school?

So you get one theory in your head and another feeling in your gut, in which case you really are ripe for demagogues.

Question: Doesn't the promotion of ethnic identity foster bigotry and racial division?

Michael Novak: I don't think ethnicity carries along with it any more bigotry than other things. I think the statement we just had back here a moment ago about the best and the brightest, and the people who pretend to universal values, and so forth, also has its own form of bigotry, often very damaging to blacks and Puerto Ricans and others, as well as white ethnics.

Now it seems to me that in this world there is freedom for human beings, in a way that there isn't for lions and tigers and other things. And, one of the differences, therefore, is that human beings create different cultures. They create different ways of being a human being, being a man, being a woman—the relationships between parents and children, the meaning of age, the way in which God is conceived—all these things.

The way that social orders and economic orders are identified differ quite dramatically from culture to culture. I think that's great. That has great possibilities, and it increases the possibility of freedom in the future—the more variety that there is.

The more mono-culturist you get, the more you try to bring about a kind of unity, it seems to me, the more totalitarian you might be. I take some comfort in the fact that the most negative comments on my book are seen both in *Pravda* and in the *New York Times*. (Laughter) There is a great fear of people being themselves, and a great sense that in order to be really human you have to be a certain type.

So let me end on this point about bigotry. One out of every five white ethnics in the United States, and by that I essentially mean the Southern and Eastern Europeans, already lives in black neighborhoods, compared to one out of eighteen Anglo-Americans.

Now among such people who have not gone to college, there isn't that intellectual hygiene which means that the way you fight bigotry is to get it out of your language. They call one another names. They have harsh names for one another, and they talk a kind of hard language. If you go into any working class district, and those of you who are in labor do this and know this very well, you would see far more blacks than whites and Puerto Ricans, and everybody is together at bars, at play—in all kinds of ways. You see more integration than you would ever see on a college campus, or among the best and the brightest.

Now I'm not denying, I want to repeat—I'm not denying, that there are, indeed, hard and destructive manifestations of ethnicity. There's no doubt about it. There are hard and awful manifestations of everything human that I know—even love and truth. The problem is, given this as a reality, how to make it creative rather than destructive.

Carl Gershman: In my initial remarks, I didn't say that ethnicity or nationalism was *per se*

something positive or progressive. I said that everything has to be looked at in broader terms and related to other values which would include democracy or the abolition of bigotry, or what have you.

I think that as a general rule, it might be possible to say that to the degree that the expression of ethnicity or nationalism has a democratic impulse behind it, to that degree (despite what may be the inevitable prejudices of some individuals) there will be an alliance across racial lines. There will be class solidarity, as opposed to division.

I think we have to look at those situations where nationalism or ethnicity become bigotry and where demagogues can move in. Now there have been many situations like that.

Generally, these are situations where an ethnic

or a national group feels particularly threatened: where an ideology imposed through incitement or through appeals to frustration can take hold of an ethnic or a national group and give it expansionist and anti-democratic impulses. In those types of cases, nationalism can be quite dangerous.

But if ethnicity or nationalism is totally ignored or dismissed as something inherently reactionary, then you may very well provide conditions where demagogues can, in fact, move in and appeal to those negative factors which do exist. Thus, those who start with the view that nationalism is anti-democratic will be helping to create the conditions to ensure that this is what it will be.

Nationalism exists. It will always exist, more powerfully, perhaps, at some times than at others. The question is how to respond to it.

Annual Award Luncheon

Tom Kahn

I want to say one or two things and then proceed with the introduction of the main event. I want to pick up on George Meany's message of greeting. We do not come together at this conference merely to celebrate our 70th anniversary, as impressive as that achievement is. But really to reaffirm what we have been doing in the past seventy years. And to make that reaffirmation now at a moment of grave national crisis. Do not worry. I'm not going to discuss the grave national crisis, except to deal with only one aspect of it which disturbs me very much.

I am very worried about the mood and the spirit of the American people these days as a consequence of what has taken place in Southeast Asia. I'm not talking about the war itself: how we got in, whether we should have gotten in, what we did while we were there. I am talking about the way in which the war was brought to a conclusion. And that way, it seems to me, is one which threatens the country with a new wave of isolationism.

Many people have talked about the impact of isolationism on our foreign policy, but that's not what disturbs me at this point. What disturbs me is that my reading of history suggests that whenever the American people give themselves over to a mood of isolationism in foreign policy it goes hand in hand with an internal spirit of meanness—of not being open to the problems of people right here at home.

When an announced Democratic Presidential candidate, who happens to come from the South, indicates that the Vietnamese refugees really ought to settle somewhere in Asia and not burden our society with their problems, I'm worried about that.

And when the liberal Governor of California, a Democrat, also questions with very great concern whether the influx of Vietnamese refugees will wreck that state's economy, I detect a spirit of smallness.

And this, I believe, is a spirit which, if not counteracted, is going to react upon organizations like the League for Industrial Democracy and undermine the essential idealism upon which organizations like ours depend as we try to build

programs to advance political, economic and social democracy in America.

We cannot let this self-destructive spirit engulf us and that's one of the reasons I was particularly gratified by the panel sessions at this conference. I wish that all of you had attended these panel sessions. What they really were about was taking a hard look at the present to see where we're going in the future.

We had an unusual session Friday night featuring two members of Congress discussing what kind of political parties we want to have in the United States. This morning we heard what I consider one of the most outstanding presentations I've heard in years by Admiral Zumwalt on what kind of defense program we want for the United States and for the survival of the free world in the years ahead. And then we had the panel, also this morning, which explored the social roots of American democracy and how we have to relocate those roots and then build upon them.

This is the spirit in which I think we want to celebrate our seventieth birthday. By looking back



to what we have achieved, true, but then looking very hard at the threats to what we believe in today and then by looking to the future to what we can yet achieve. And from this point of view, I don't think we could possibly have chosen any individual more appropriate than the man I want to introduce to present our annual award to the award recipients.

We gave some thought to the question of who should do this on our seventieth anniversary. We began thinking about those days when the LID was founded—1905. Well in 1901, the Socialist Party was founded and we thought perhaps we could have Carl Gershman who is the Director of the heir to that organization present the award. He is, however, too young, and does not have that air of tradition and gravity about him. Then we thought about another organization which is our younger sister organization, as it were, because it was not founded until four years after we were. And we thought of the NAACP and of course, Roy Wilkins.

Like the LID, but historically speaking on a

much larger scale, the NAACP has brought forth and drawn sustenance from the best that's in America and in the American people. It has drawn on a spirit of social responsibility, a sense of the interconnectedness of the human family, large ideals and noble visions about how people should live.

We, the two organizations, LID and NAACP, have historically risen and fallen together with fluctuations of these impulses in the American people. And we have interacted again and again in ways that I would like to think have substantially contributed to the growth of each.

Nobody better embodies the spirit I've been talking about and which in fact I think may be threatened today than the next speaker. I met him first twelve years ago when I was working with Bayard Rustin in organizing the March on Washington. I've had occasion to know him again and again as Chairman of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights with which the LID is affiliated. He really needs no further introduction. I give you Roy Wilkins.

Roy Wilkins

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. I really have an easy job today because of the honorees whom you have so wisely chosen and because I am an old friend. I see many of my friends of long standing here in this room today. They are men by whom I have shaped my beliefs and ideals, men who have contributed in a very substantial way to my understanding of the American government and what America was supposed to do.

I'm grateful for the lifelong opportunity that you have given me to have fellowship with so many people who have offered sincerely their encouragement, their good will and occasionally their pocketbook.

I think I ought first thank you for your award to me in 1970 which was received by my associate, Dr. John A. Morsell, who unfortunately passed away last August and left me bereft.

This illustrates how we have gone up and down together. Our fortunes have been the fortunes of those who have striven to interpret America—her trade unionists, your honorees, and others like David Dubinsky. All the people who saw a vision of America as it should be in the light of the



Constitution and the Bill of Rights made a contribution. They are guiding us today as we try to fight our way out of a depression.

I want to thank you for this opportunity that I have to be among friends. It has not been easy. The black community is suffering the most serious pressures and strains. For we know that there is no job like the job of getting along without a paycheck. There is no recession, there is no unemployment, until you lose your job. I think the only thing that ought to be said about the recession is nothing. People have discussed it, rediscussed it, talked about it. The only thing that can be certain is that the first task is to get people back to work. That is what the recession means for us. Every scheme that doesn't put people back to work is secondary.

No two men have demonstrated greater vision and commitment to the advancement of economic and social justice than those you have chosen to honor today. I will now read the citation:

We honor today two vigorous and committed trade unionists who have risen to positions of leadership in unions having long and distinguished traditions of service to working people. Both the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union have carried the torch of social and industrial democracy to untold numbers of immigrant and racial minorities.

We honor these two men for their dedication to the workers they represent, a dedication reflected in their unceasing efforts to extend

full democratic and economic rights to members of minority groups. Their devotion to working people has led them to speak out for enlightened trade policies against a mammoth corporate greed which has resulted in the loss of millions of jobs at home and the exploitation of low-wage non-union labor in other lands. We honor them, too, for their tireless leadership in the struggle to make full employment the first domestic priority of our government.

They have also demonstrated a unique commitment to democracy and human freedom. They have supported the basic human rights of intellectuals, ethnic minorities, and ordinary working people when these rights have been violated by dictatorial or totalitarian governments. In an era of uncertainty and self-doubt, they have held firmly to the conviction that democracy is inviolable for all people—here and abroad.

For all these reasons, the League for Industrial Democracy is proud to present its

70th Annual Award

to

SOL C. CHAIKIN and JACOB SHEINKMAN
two individuals who, at a time of national crisis,
have retained the vision of a just and free
society.

May 3, 1975
New York City

Jacob Sheinkman

I am pleased to receive this award of the LID. I might say that in accepting it, I'm really accepting it on behalf of my own union, rather than for myself.

At the same time, I can't think of any other person I'd rather share it with than Chick Chaikin. We have shared a great deal together—roast beef, chicken and today we share fish. (Laughter) There was a time when I would see Chick only out of town at various meetings. I'm glad to see that I'm seeing him more often here in New York City because we do enjoy and share common views and common ideas and I really would like to say that I consider him a real friend and a great trade unionist.

I can't think of any other person from whom I would have liked to receive this award than Roy Wilkins. He is a person who has made his page in American history and has contributed so much to the life of our society.

This year the LID reaches its Biblical three score and ten and instead of being satisfied to rest on its laurels and remember past glories, it remains a vital and a vibrant organization searching for new ways to serve and for trails to be blazed. In 1905, when he presided over the founding convention of the League, the great humanist Upton Sinclair said that he had gone through college without getting any understanding of the labor movement and the contribution it has made to the American way of life.

Need for Education on Labor

Seventy years later, unfortunately, the same condition prevails. A student today who wants to know about Etruscan civilization or take a course in pottery or how to conquer the culinary art for credit can find such courses listed in the curriculum of many colleges. But there is little for a student who wants to learn about the history of American labor unless he or she enrolls in a school that specializes in the subject.

There is little chance for exposure to this important factor of our past and our present. And in pre-college education it is worse. As far as history textbooks in elementary and secondary school levels are concerned, there wasn't and isn't an American labor movement.

Perhaps this void is underscored by a call I received this past Thursday from my twelve year

old son's social studies teacher. He called to thank me for making available to his social studies class the Amalgamated film, *The Inheritance*. Despite the fact that some 90 percent of the students are grandchildren of immigrant parents, they have little or no comprehension of child labor, sweatshops, labor struggles or the unions that built this country and helped further and strengthen our democratic ideals.

On the college level, the LID has striven to fill the void created by the educational system in understanding the role of a free democratic trade union movement in our society. It has sought with its limited resources to establish a dialogue between organized labor and college students and thereby help remove the misconceptions that continue to exist about organized labor.

To those of our critics who claim that we are dying from success, we need only point out that the labor movement is and remains the people's lobby. No institution in our nation speaks up so persistently and eloquently for the disadvantaged, the elderly, the deprived, the ill-treated and the hopeless—not only in the United States, not only for members of trade unions but for all who need



a strong voice to be raised in their behalf.

Perhaps, as Secretary Dunlop suggested in his talk yesterday at the 25th anniversary celebration of the Hillman Foundation, the time has come for the LID to join with organized labor in removing the barriers to communication between organized labor and the teachers of these students

The Democratic System

The events of the past several years have served to underscore the role which our free institutions and we as citizens must play in making the democratic process work. Our ability to survive has been tested this past year by the gravest constitutional crisis since the Civil War and should answer those cynics who would belittle the inherent values of a system born almost two hundred years ago.

At the same time, we must not forget Santayana's admonition that those who do not remember the past are doomed to relive it. We are in the midst of a grave economic crisis. If history teaches us anything, it is that democracy is a fragile structure which can be undermined and destroyed by the failure to rectify such conditions.

America has been the land of hope. For too many it has become a land of despair. But their voices are not being heard. We have a hapless administration in Washington which refuses to recognize the fact that American workers today are not ready to react passively to ever-increasing unemployment as they did in the Great Depression. There are those who oppose our political system, who stand ready to exploit a rising tide of anger and frustration generated by an administration which accepts unemployment as a way of life.

If the Ford Administration believes that 90 percent of the American public is prepared to trade off unemployment to stem the tide of inflation, it is playing a dangerous game. The Jobs Now Rally held last week should have made that clear. Apparently the U.S. Senate by its vote this week which would have provided funds to create more than a million jobs refuses to recognize how desperate the situation has become for nine million unemployed Americans. The greatest deliberative body in the world has succumbed to the cynicism generated by the propaganda of the Ford Administration. But I say that Americans are not ready to accept unemployment to stem inflation.

If some of our critics believe that those who lead American labor have become fat cats inured to the concerns of the people, I ask you, how do

you answer someone who writes as follows, and I quote:

I am so downhearted, it's just getting me down. I don't know which way to turn or go. First the Amalgamated Hospital Insurance will soon run out and I don't have the money to meet the payments. I have rheumatoid arthritis and kidney problems that I need medicine for. Each day my nerves are getting more upset. I keep hoping for better days, but when?

Should I send her the answer of the economic arm of the leading brokerage concern in the United States that the business cycle is working its way toward economic recovery later this year? What answer should I give more than one thousand Amalgamated members of the Freedman-Marx Clothing Company in Richmond, Virginia who were thrown out of work last month? Even though they stopped working at their machines and held a prayer meeting in the hope that the plant would not close, the sad truth, friends, is more than prayers are needed to turn this economic crisis around.

Together, these workers represent more than 13,000 years of employment in apparel manufacturing in the company which has no jobs for them at present. How can I answer these unemployed Amalgamated members? Shall I tell them you'll be able to live on your severance pay until you find another job when there are no other apparel jobs available in their area? Shall I tell a fifty-six year old worker who has worked forty years, who went to work at the age of sixteen for this company, that you have to wait until you're sixty-five, until you draw your pension? What will he live on until then?

How can I answer thousands of other unemployed Amalgamated members? Shall I tell all of them to wait for a new day that the economists tell us may be coming in '76? Or '77? Or 1980? We in the American labor movement believe that government must begin to look at people not as simple statistics, but as flesh and blood. No level of unemployment is acceptable!

Economic Planning

It's time for America to take the path of economic planning, the sort of planning that the American free enterprise system has resisted thus far. As our preeminence in natural resources, sophisticated industrial technology and abundant capital diminish, the need for a formal coordinated

planning body becomes more evident. The fact that our federal government has not established such a body, one that can anticipate events and recommend action, can be seen in the degree of economic chaos and lack of clear policy that threatens us today.

We should be ready not only to manage our present but our future. We need to determine all the material, financial and human resources available today and those that could be available in the reasonable future and relate them to the anticipated needs in equivalent time periods and make recommendations for their best use in ways equitable and fair to all Americans. The present economic turmoil all about us is the product of yesterday's futures that were not managed, not planned.

Yes, we in the trade union movement care about the welfare of our members. But we also care about the well-being of our fellow-citizens and just as importantly, we are concerned about the future well-being of our political system. We look hopefully to the future and to a better day.

The great chronicler of America, Walt Whitman, said it best when he wrote:

Long, too long America,
Traveling roads all even and peaceful you
learn'd from joys and prosperity only,
But now, ah now, to learn from crises of
anguish, advancing, grappling with direst
fate and recoiling not,
And now to conceive and show to the world
what your children en-masse really are ...

Thank you very much. (Applause)

Sol C. Chaikin

Roy Wilkins, some day, oh that happy day, when Americans will look at each other and extend their hands in brotherhood, when they'll embrace each other and forget the words of prejudice and the thoughts that demean us all, when they welcome each other at work and at play and in their homes, regardless of their race, regardless of their color, regardless of their creed and national origin, when that happy day comes to this country, those of us who are then alive will remember you and give thanks that you came our way.

Jack, I'm delighted that you spoke first. I can't consider that I have heard in recent weeks such an exposition of what we in the trade union movement feel when we read those cold statistics of almost 9 percent unemployed, when we hear the pronouncements of Alan Greenspan and some of the economic analysts which abound in this country.

I don't intend to keep you much longer, my friends. I'd just like to share a few personal thoughts with you. I'm delighted that Roy Wilkins talked in terms of numbers. There are many numbers which have great meaning for me in terms of my development as a young boy, a young man and then as an organizer in the I.L.G.

The first is 1900. Seventy-five years ago almost to this day, actually on June 3rd, a small determined band of workers put their hands out to each

other and pledged to each other not their particular strengths but their weakness, and not particularly their courage but their fear. They shared their experiences of exploitation, of oppression, of suppression. The one thing they had in common, aside from their humanity, was the fact that they



worked in the then sweatshops of the apparel industry of New York City. They formed the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

A Freer Society

Five years later, young intellectuals looked at each other and said to each other that we have something to say and the world ought to hear and particularly workers ought to hear about it. We have a vision of a freer society. We have a vision of a society where workers could work with dignity under humane conditions, where they would have something to say about their wages, about their conditions of work, about their hours of work.

In 1910, from Russia, again from exploitation and from religious oppression as well, came my parents. Not then married, not then my parents, they came to this country of opportunity, a country that held promise of some measure of freedom, some measure of opportunity.

Then in 1930, as a young boy of twelve, I used to come down to the Workmen's Circle Mittel Shuleh. This was a place where you could come and learn Yiddish and not only learn the language but learn Yiddish culture, customs, literature.

My parents realized then that I was growing away from them and away from their background. I was then in attendance at American schools, public schools, and picked up very quickly—having been born here in 1918—the accents of the streets, picked up very quickly the intelligence that you garnered from the public school system of those days.

So they persuaded me to go to a Yiddish school. And I went to the Yiddish school on Wilkins Avenue in the Bronx and then went down to Manhattan to the then Mittel Shuleh which was equivalent to a high school education. I was twelve years of age.

And that was 1930. And why is that number essential? Not because I went to the Arbeterring Shuleh. Most of the Yiddish that I learned then I forgot, unfortunately, because I have been working in the Diaspora, away from New York City, all of my adult life, really. Some of the fine giants of Yiddish literature, I recall. I hardly recall their words but I recall their names.

I remember 1930 because the school was located at 7 East 15th Street which was the site of the Rand School in those days. The Rand School in those days was the heart and the mind and the guts of intellectual socialism of that day and of

this day as well. And as a young boy of twelve, when my lessons were through on the third and fourth floors of that school, I would wander down and sneak into the auditorium and sit at the furthermost bench and listen to Harry Laidler, Gus Claessens, Norman Thomas, Algernon Lee and Louis Waldman.

I would listen to the people who were then declaiming for all to hear that it was true that there would be a better day, that 1930 was desperate, that 1930 was demeaning, that 1930 was bitter. But there was a way of governing ourselves and each other, of working with ourselves and each other so that we could work in dignity, so that we could keep body and soul together, so that we could participate in the political processes of the day and make life just a little more rewarding and a little more enriching for ourselves and for our children and for our children's children. That was the first time that I heard the words "League for Industrial Democracy."

The next number of importance was 1940 because it was during that year on a happy day that David Dubinsky gave me an opportunity to become an organizer for the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. And that will be thirty-five years ago, this coming August.

And it is, Roy Wilkins, this confluence of those numbers and those dates that come to me on this day at this moment. I am most delighted to indicate this to you and also to my wife Rosalind. Three of our four children and three of our four grandchildren are in this room because the Mittel Schuleh no longer exists for young Jews, particularly those who abound in suburbia.

A Union Family

The opportunity to come to a Rand School at the tender age of ten, eleven, twelve and fourteen hardly exists and I remember with delight the moments I spent with my father who was a worker and a member of the I.L.G. just listening—hardly understanding but listening about the problems in the shops, about the employers, about the shop committee, about the negotiations. I hardly understood but still accepted as if through osmosis the awareness of what it meant to be a worker, to sit on this side of the bench, to sit at the machine with a bundle of work beside you and the foreman in front of you.

Now what does it all mean? There's nothing

special in Chick Chaikin, nothing at all. There are many of our generation who were born to immigrant parents, born to workers, and born to a society which held out very little hope for the future. We came into some relationship with an ideal and that ideal was to live in a society where workers could work with dignity and also have a role in determining their destiny . . . where you would get from the community that which you needed so long as you were prepared to offer the community that which you were capable of performing.

We have come through the trade union movement to carry that ideal forward. Oh, we speak of those ideals now in different accents. We don't speak so openly any more of the socialist society. We changed the accent simply, slightly. We talk in terms of social democracy. And in many places where we live and where we work, we don't even use those terms. We talk in terms of the description of the American trade union movement. Essentially, the ideals and the objectives toward which we move forward inexorably are still the ideals and objectives of the forerunners of the League for Industrial Democracy.

I have tried to organize in Texas, in Arkansas, in Louisiana and in the upper reaches of New England, in the Midwest as well, and today in the South Bronx and in Bed-Sty in Brooklyn and in Harlem in Manhattan. When we talk to workers about joining our union, when we talk to them about having something to say about what their work is worth, what their time is worth, what their sweat is worth, what their intelligence is worth, we also begin to talk to them not only about today at the machine in the shop but also about the society that we hope to create, of which they are an important part.

For A Better America

There is no inconsistency. Quite the contrary.

There is a confluence of ideas and of activity. Jack Sheinkman and I devote our time to our unions. We know that what in reality we are doing is not a simple, insular, self-centered idea of garnering members for our respective organizations. Not at all. It is garnering people, workers, ideas, and commitments for a better America for all the people of this country and indeed beyond that for all the people of this world.

I have a small regret. I regret that Louis Stulberg, our own International President, is unable to be here. I think you all know that he is recovering from an accident which occurred to him some weeks ago. I want you to know he's coming along beautifully. He's walking again and we expect him back at our headquarters within a short time, and I certainly am looking forward to that.

I do know that whether it's Jack Sheinkman or whether it's Chick Chaikin, whether it's President Murray Finley or President Sol Stetin, the American trade union movement, though on some levels might have some differences of opinion, basically speaks with one voice. And I would like to say that in my judgment, that voice personified by George Meany is the single most powerful voice for a progressive America.

Jack, you are oh so right about pointing out the almost callous indifferences of the present administration to our problems and our needs. But so long as we have you and so long as we have George Meany and so long as we have a flourishing, vibrant trade union movement, we'll keep this administration's feet to the fire. We will continually remind them of our needs, of our value, of our worth and of the fact that they have to bear in mind that they are dealing not with statistics but with living, breathing human beings who need the government's help because the things that need to be done are beyond the reach of individuals to do for themselves. (Applause)

ABOUT THE LID . . .

Since its founding in 1905 by Upton Sinclair, Jack London, Clarence Darrow and other well known writers and civic leaders, the League for Industrial Democracy has been an outstanding educational organization dedicated to increasing democracy in American economic, political and cultural life.

It has advocated democracy as more than a passing fad, more than a principle applicable to but one sector of our social life. It regards democracy as a social process that, in the words of John Dewey, who was for many years President of the League, should be "a living reality in every aspect and reach of our common life."

To this end, LID members are devoted to the abolition of poverty, the struggle for full racial equality, the strengthening of trade unions, the expansion of civil liberties, the extension of public ownership and democratic economic planning.

Through pamphlets, conferences, institutes and lectures, the LID seeks to deepen public understanding of these issues and their inter-relatedness.



League for Industrial Democracy
112 East 19th Street, New York, N.Y. 10003

Nathaniel M. Minkoff
President

Tom Kahn
Chairman of the Board

Albert Shanker
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